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Convicting the Innocent in Transnational
Criminal Cases: A Comparative Institutional
Analysis Approach to the problem*
BY
L. Song ~ichardson?

The adjudication of transnational criminal cases is burdened by a very
narrow compulsory process mechanism known as Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties. These treaties regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors
and explicitly prevent their use by criminal defendants. The danger of inaccurate
verdicts and wrongful convictions that may result from unequal access to
evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed transnational adjudication
process, and specifically, its evidentiary method. Building on the works of Neil
Komesar, Ronald Coase, and Mancur Nelson, the author utilizes a comparative
institutional analysis approach to consider the question of how to obtain parity
between the prosecution and the defense in the ability to compel foreign
evidence in transnational criminal cases. The issue is of great importance in a
post-911 1 world, where the fairness and accuracy norms that underpin criminal
prosecutions are increasingly ephemeral and illusory. The comparative
framework illumes the important considerations for identifying the institution
best suited to achieve the norm of parity. No criminal process scholar explicitly
utilizes the comparative institutional analysis framework. This oversight is a
mistake. The comparative framework provides an ideal theory to dissect
criminal process questions. Explicit institutional comparison, rather than
simplistic single institutional considerations, should underlie all criminal process
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My question is: Why should American citizens accused of a crime. . .be stuck
with a process that the Justice Department itself has called "cumbersome and
ineffective?"'
At the core of the legal objections is the belief that it is improper in our
adversarial system of justice to deny defendants compulsory process and other
effective procedures from[sic] compelling evidence abroad if those procedures
are available to the prosecution. . ..
Senator Jesse ~ e l r n s ~

This Article begins with two scenarios drawn from actual cases. They help
describe and contextualize the disparity in the ability to compel foreign evidence
that exists in the adjudication of transnational criminal cases as a result of the
powerful Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (hereinafter MLATs). MLATs
regularize foreign evidence gathering for prosecutors and explicitly prevent their
use by criminal defendants. The facts highlight how the treaties create a
compulsion disparity between the government and defendants in their ability to
gather foreign evidence. Underlying these facts is the dark premise that the
transnational criminal adjudication process in the United States, particularly its
evidentiary method, is deeply flawed.

A. Scenario One: The ~ n l u c k ~
y riveg
Mr. Atkins is long haul truck driver who lives in Canada. He makes his
living delivering items to or picking up items from the United States. He is
barely able to make ends meet. He uses all the money he makes to care for his
wife and two children. Because of his limited resources, he does not possess his
own truck. Instead, he works for a number of trucking companies that allow him
to use their trucks when they hire him.
One evening, Mr. Atkins received a telephone call from Gary, the
dispatcher for one of the trucking companies. Gary and Mr. Atkins were well
acquainted since Mr. Atkins had worked for that trucking company many times
in the past. Gary asked if he was available to pick up a load of steel pipes from
the United States early the next morning. Mr. Atkins was happy to agree. There

1. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Concerning the Cayman Islands, Report of the Committee
tm Foreign Relations, U.S.-Cayman Is., at 175, Mar. 19, 1990, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 101-8, (1989)
[hereinafter Cayman Islands] (quoting Senator Jesse Helms).
2. Quoted in Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 91 AM.J. INT'L L. 93,101 (1997).
3. This scenario is loosely based on the facts of a criminal case in which the author was
involved. The names and facts have been slightly altered to protect the privacy of the parties
involved and to better illustrate the dangers of the lack of compulsion parity in transnational criminal
cases.
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was nothing unusual about the conversation. He would be paid his normal fee
and, as usual, the truck would be waiting for him in the company's locked and
secure yard. The keys would be in the ignition and everything he needed to pick
up the load would be on the truck, including tarps.
At 4 a.m. the next morning, Mr. Atkins arrived at the trucking company. He
met John, an employee who guarded the yard, at the locked gate. He knew John
from his prior work for the company. The two chatted for a few minutes and
then John unlocked the gate and led Mr. Atkins to the flatbed truck he would be
driving. Mr. Atkins inspected the truck to make sure that everything he needed
was there. He noticed that there were tarps rolled up and secured to the back of
the trailer. Everything appeared to be in order so Mr. Atkins drove to the border.
When Mr. Atkins arrived at the border, he was sent by a border patrol agent
to secondary inspection. He was told that it was just a routine inspection. Mr.
Atkins was not surprised. Since September 1I&,he had been sent to secondary
inspection before. He went to the waiting room, drank some coffee and read the
paper while waiting for agents to complete the inspection. Meanwhile, border
patrol agents conducted a thorough search of the truck. They unrolled the tarps
that were secured on the back of the trailer. They found 100 kilograms of
marijuana carefully hidden inside.
Mr. Atkins was arrested on the spot and taken into federal custody. He was
subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance in federal district court. His defense was that he did not know the
marijuana was in the tarps. Pretrial, Mr. Atkins asked the Court to subpoena
Gary, the dispatcher, and John, the guard of the trucking yard. If called as a
witness, John would testify that Mr. Atkins had not been in the truck yard until
he arrived early one morning to drive the truck to the United States and that Mr.
Atkins did not touch or unroll the tarps before he left the truck yard that
morning. John did not want to voluntarily travel to the United States to testify
because he feared that his company would fire him if he testified on Mr. Atkins'
behalf. John believed that someone from the company may have known about
the drugs that were in the tarps. He did not want to lose his job. He would only
appear if he received a subpoena.
The judge denied Mr. Atkins' request. Although he determined that the
testimony of Gary and John would be material and relevant, the judge stated that
his subpoena power did not extend beyond the border. If Mr. Atkins wanted to
present the testimony of his witnesses, the judge stated that he would be willing
to send a diplomatic request to a Canadian court asking it to take the testimony
of the two witnesses in Canada. However, this diplomatic process, known as
letters rogatory, could take years to complete and there was no guarantee the
Canadians would agree.
Mr. Atkins then asked the government for help. The government had the
power to compel the appearance of Mr. Atkins' witnesses in the United States
under the provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United
States and Canada. The treaty requires the signatories to provide evidence,
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including witness testimony, for use in a foreign jurisdiction upon a proper
government request. In other words, the treaty creates transnational compulsory
process. The government refused to make the request on Mr. Atkins' behalf.
However, the government did invoke the treaty to obtain its own evidence from
Canada.
Because Mr. Atkins was in custody and had no funds to post blail, he had an
untenable choice to make: remain in custody for what could be years while the
diplomatic process proceeded, or go to trial without his witnesses. He proceeded
to trial, and testified on his own behalf. However, in the face of his
uncorroborated testimony, he was convicted.
B. Scenario Two: The Man with a New suitcase4
John Smith was exhausted but happy to arrive back home in Seattle after a
two-week vacation in Mexico. The past 24 hours had been rough. His suitcase
had been stolen the night before his departure, leaving him desperately searching
for new luggage in the few hours remaining before his flight home. Luckily, he
found the time to purchase new luggage at a large open air market and to file a
police report for his lost luggage in Mexico. He had noticed a chemical smell
emanating from his new suitcase, but he did not have time to be picky. He
dismissed the smell, chalking it up to the suitcase being new. A Mexican citizen
named Michael Ortiz had first-hand knowledge of these events. Ortiz had helped
Smith place an advertisement in a Mexican newspaper requesting return of his
stolen luggage and had helped Smith pack the new suitcase.
While drinking a coffee during a layover in Texas, Smith did not know that
airport officials were checking all in-transit luggage for contraband. As he
dreamt about sleeping in his own bed for the first time in two weeks, his suitcase
aroused suspicion because of a strong chemical odor emanating from it. The
police opened his suitcase but found nothing unusual inside. The police then
tested a fragment of the suitcase itself. That fragment tested positive for cocaine,
The police checked the identification tag and found Smith's name and address.
Upon exiting his plane at the Seattle-Tacoma airport, John Smith was arrested.
He was subsequently charged with knowingly importing cocaine into the United
States.
Pretrial, Smith requested the aid of the prosecutor and the Court in
compelling the testimony of Ortiz and the police report from Mexico. The
prosecutor refused. He said that he was under no obligation to utilize the
existing treaty between the United States and Mexico to request evidence on
Smith's behalf. The Court stated that although the requested evidence was
relevant and material, his subpoena power did not extend to Mexico and thus, he
could not compel Ortiz to appear or the Mexican government to release the

4. The inspiration for this scenario originated from the facts of United States v. Filippi, 918
F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1990).
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police report. The Court suggested that Smith request the evidence through
diplomatic channels, although the Court acknowledged it might be years before
the Mexican government responded, if it responded at all.
Smith proceeded to trial without the witness or the document. He testified
to these facts, but his testimony was uncorroborated. The jury convicted him.

The danger of inaccurate verdicts and wrongful convictions that result from
unequal access to evidence highlights the need to resolve this flawed
transnational adjudication process, and specifically, its evidentiary method.
Failure to do so results in cognizable deprivations to our system of criminal
justice in general and to defendants in particular, whether the high-profile
alleged "terrorist" or the less provocative, but far more common, truck driver or
traveler. As recognized by the Supreme Court over 30 years ago:
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by
the prosecution or by the defen~e.~
MLATs create inequities in evidence-gathering capabilities that affect the
accuracy of criminal trials by distorting the evidence available to fact-finders.
When the ability to compel evidence is unequal, accuracy and fairness norms,
such as punishing the guilty and freeing the innocent, can be illusory.

How to attain equity and fairness in an adversarial system is a perennial
question of criminal procedure in the United States. Scholars seeking an answer
often turn to social norm theory: legal liberalism: or formalism. No criminal
process scholar explicitly utilizes the comparative institutional analysis
framework to examine criminal process questions. While these other theories
can identify aspirational social justice and equality norms, only comparative
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974).
6 . For example, a social norm theorist would argue that the courts should not restrict the
ability of a frictionless political process to define the appropriate limits of law enforcement behavior.
See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares and Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1988 U . CHI. LEGALF. 197 (1998), Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L.
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.L.J. 1153 (1998). When the political
process has struck the balance between individual rights and effective law enforcement, courts
should not substitute their decision-makingfor that of the political process.
7. A legal liberalist would argue that the courts must define the appropriate limits of political
action. See generally William H . Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist
Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARYL. REV.127 (2004) (critiquing legal liberalists'
reliance upon the courts). For both social norm and legal liberalism theorists, it is the goal that
animates institutional choice.
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institutional analysis determines whether the courts, the political process, or the
market is the best institution to achieve them. The examination of criminal
process questions in the United States should be enlightened by understanding
each institution's competence and ability compared to that of the others and
understanding the interactions amongst them.
Resolving the disparity in the ability to compel foreign evidence is difficult
in light of relative congressional indifference and the lasting reverberations of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Scholars argue that inequities in the
power to produce evidence created by MLATs violate the ~onstitution.~
Scholarly approaches, however, either fail to explore the question of institutional
choice or consider it as an a f t e r t h ~ u ~ h tThis
. ~ Article considers how
comparative institutional analysis can inform the question of how to obtain
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases adjudicated in the United
States. The relevant decision-makers for purposes of comparison are the Senate,
which ratifies the treaties, the executive10 that negotiates them, the courts, and
the evidence gathering market.ll This Article concludes that the best solution
for remedying the compulsion disparity in transnational evidence gathering is
for courts to establish a moderate right to compulsion parity.
Compulsion disparities undermine the very legitimacy of the criminal
justice system. In the absence of parity, there can be no confidence that criminal
adjudications result in reliable outcomes. By analyzing the question of unequal
access to evidence in transnational cases, this Article demonstrates the utility of
comparative institutional analysis for analyzing criminal process issues
generally, by illuminating institutional considerations that transcend this
particular setting.
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I1 describes the comparative

8. See, e.g., Ian Conner, Peoples Divided: The AppIcation of United States Constitutional
Protections in International Criminal Law Enforcement, 11WM. & MARYBILLRTS. J. 495 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Frank Tuerkheimer, Globalization of U.S. Law Enforcement: Does the
Constitution Come Along? 39 HouS. L. REV. 307 (2002); 3 MICHAEL
ABBELL & BRUNOA. RISTAU,
INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,
CRIMINAL,
OBTAINING EVIDENCE:
CRIMINAL,4 12-3-3, at
87 (1990).
10. The executive is shorthand for federal prosecutors, State Department officials,
representatives from the Attorney Generals office, and various administrative agencies, all of whom
were involved in negotiating these treaties. See ETHAN A. NADELMANN,
COPS ACROSSBORDERS:
THEINTERNATIONALIZATIONOF U.S. CRIMINAL
LAWENFORCEMENT
324 (1997).
11. The term market is employed to describe the actions parties in a criminal case take to meet
their demand for foreign evidence and to affect the supply of evidence available to the other party.
The manner in which these parties interact with each other and with domestic or foreign entities to
negotiate the provision of evidence can be termed "transactions" since they involve the transfer of
goods, for example, evidence. In the evidence-gathering market, each party is acting selfishly, but
from these actions there "emerges a structure that affects and constrains them all. Once formed, a
market becomes a force in itseIf, and a force that the constitutive units acting singly or in small
numbers cannot control." Kenneth N. Waltz, TKEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS24-26 (1979)
cited in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law,24 YALEJ.
INT'L L. 1,13 (1999).

20081

CONVICTING THE INNOCENT

69

institutional analysis framework and its application to criminal process
questions. Part I11 contextualizes application of the framework by exploring the
norm of compulsion parity. Part IV discusses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs), a mechanism for regularizing foreign evidence-gathering, and
explains how the treaties create a compulsion disparity in the United States
between the government and criminal defendants in their ability to gather
foreign evidence. Part V examines the relative merits and disadvantages of the
market, the political process, the executive, and the courts for resolving the
compulsion disparity created by MLATs. Finally, Part V1 concludes with a
recommendation for the institutional approach best suited to rectify the current
disparity in the transnational criminal process.
11.
THEVALUEOF CHOICE:COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
AND ITS
RELATIONSHIP TO CRIMINAL PROCESS QUESTIONS

A. The Framework in General
As developed by Neil Komesar, the comparative institutional analysis
framework addresses the question of how to decide which institution12 is best
equipped to achieve a desired policy or goal.13 Rather than focusing on what the
best policy is or what the law should be,14 the f r a m e w o r k spotlights the
12. The term 'institution" is used in this Article in its narrow sense to describe "large-scale
social decision-making processes-markets, communities, political processes, and courts." NEILK.
KOMESAR,
LAW'SLIMITS:THERULE OF LAWAND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND
OF RIGHTS 3 1 (2001)
[hereinafter LAW'S LIMITS]. An alternative view held by institutional economists and social
scientists, understands institutions as the rules that govern or constrain decisions. Under this view,
institutions have three primary characteristics: formal rules (for example, judicial or political rules),
informal rules (for example, custom) and enforcement mechanisms for enforcing those rules. See,
e.g., DOUGLASS
C. NORTH,INSTITUTIONS,INSTITUTIONAL CHANGEAND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE
(1990). These characteristicsof institutions are the determinants of market activity.
13. Komesar draws from the works of Ronald Coase and Mancur Olsen. See NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC
POLICY 8, 29-30 (1994) [hereinafter IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES].
Coase's work demonstrates that
public policy analysis which assumes a frictionless market or government response is not useful
since perfect (frictionless) institutionalchoices do not exist. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON 1 (1960). According to Coase,
[Tlhere is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply
because the problem is not well handled by the market or the firm. Satisfactoryviews
on policy can only come from a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms
and governments handle the problem of harmful effects.
Id. at 18. According to Komesar, the "call for comparative institutional analysis inherent in
Coase's work seems not to have been heeded." IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13 at 29.
Komesar's emphasis on the distribution of stakes can be traced to Olsen's work on collective action.
See LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 30-31 11.23, (citing MANCUROLSEN, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)); IMPERFECTALTERNATNES,
Supra note 13 at 8 n.3 (same).
14. Comparative institutional analysis does not inform goal choice. IMPERFECT

70

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:1

institutions that make the decisions. Institutional choice should play a central
role in determining how to attain a desired goal because it will determine the
efficacy of the approach to that goal.
The framework takes for granted that all institutions are imperfect-that
there is no universal first and best institutional choice for every desired goal or
legal problem.15 Rather, all institutions are affected by similar dynamics
because "institutions tend to move together."16 The same systemic factors that
cause malfunctions or failures in one institution may similarly cause
malfunctions in others.17 Accepting that all institutions can fail under similar
circumstances, the choice amongst them requires a comparison to determine
which is least likely to fail in a given context.
Under comparative institutional analysis, the appropriate question is not
whether a particular institution works better in one setting than in another.18
Rather, the correct question is whether, in any given setting, one institution is
better or worse than its available alternatives.19 Once a goal is identified, "the
task is to choose among imperfect alternatives" on the basis of comparison.20
Sometimes application of the fiamework will reveal an obvious institutional
choice. At other times, when the issues are complex and involve large numbers
of relevant
the answer may entail difficult institutional
compromises. Thus, comparative analysis does not always provide easy
answers.22 However, defining a role for an institution in the absence of a
comparative approach may exacerbate existing institutional malfunctions or may
lead to counter-intuitive results.

supra note 13, at 4-5, 48, 49-50. Rather, application of the framework usually
ALTERNATIVES,
occurs after an analyst has already identified a desired policy or value. Some scholars have critiqued
the framework on this basis. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Sprawl's Dynamics: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKEFOREST L. REV. 509, 514 n.22 (2000) ("Komesar gives
only limited attention to how goal choices are made and how they fit into the process of policy
analysis."); Thomas W. Memll, Institutional Choice andPolitica1 Faith, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
959,
988 (1997) (critiquing Komesar's failure to emphasize goal choice as a critical component to
comparative institutional analysis). Others have applied the framework to the question of goal
choice. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, The Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Comparative
Institutional Analysis, Contested Social Goals, and Strategic Institutional Choice, 28 HAWAII L.
REV. 23 (2005) (arguing that the choice of social goals is contested and can be analyzed utilizing a
comparative institutionalanalysis framework). This Article does not join this discussion.
15. LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 12, at 174-75.
16. Id. at 23-29, 176; IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 23.
17. LAW'S LIMITS,
supra note 12, at 3,4, 176.
18. IMPERFECTALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 6.
19. Id.
20. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanaljsb of Institutions, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1393,1407 (1996).
21. Institutional performance is linked to variation in the numbers of relevant participants and
the complexity of the issues involved. hcreases in numbers and complexity adversely affect the
performance of most institutions. LAW'SLIMITS,
supra note 12, at 23,25.
22. Id. at 177-180.
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B. The Role of Courts
Courts play a critical role in institutional choice because they determine
which institution will decide a particular issue through the doctrinal rules or
standards they create. Sometimes a court's institutional choices are explicit.
More often, however, they are implicit in the court's decision.23
Courts make institutional decisions by defining the character of rights.24
They can create strong rights, moderate rights or no rights at all. The character
of the right represents a different institutional choice.

A court creates "strong rights and certain remedies"25 when it chooses to
undo a decision made by another institution in favor of its own judgment.26
When courts define strong rights, they create easily applied doctrinal rules27and
then leave implementation to other institutions. In the criminal process context,
the rule that indigent defendants have a right to appointed counsel in all criminal
prosecutions is an example of a strong right with a certain remedy.28If counsel
is not provided, the conviction will be reversed. The decision of how to
implement the right is left to the political process.29 Strong rights entail
"significant judicial activism7730because the court substitutes its decision for
those made by other institutions without creating a concomitant increase in its
workload, thus leaving the task of how to effectuate the right to other

institution^.^
2.

Moderate Rights

A court defines moderate rights when it decides that it is better suited to

23. Id. at 4-5, 19-20.
24. Id at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 19. Komesar likens the distinction between judicial activism and judicial activity to
the traditional dichotomy between rules and standards. Id. at 5. Both the strongest and weakest
judicial activism are found in rules that involve limited judicial activity. These rules allocate
significantresponsibilityaway from the courts to other institutions such as the market or the political
process. Id. Moderate rights involve standards and judicial balancing and therefore require the most
judicial activity. Id.
28. See, e.g., Gideonv. Wainwright, 372 U.S.335 (1963).
29. In this case, state legislatures had to determine how to h d indigent defense counsel in
order to effectuate this newly created right.
30. LAW'SLIMITS,
supra note 12, at 5. For example, in Gideon, 372 U.S.335, the Court held
that an indigent defendant had a right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions despite a Florida law
that only allowed for the appointment of counsel to indigents in capital cases.
3 1. LAW'SLIMITS,
supra note 12, at 5.
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determine how to implement the right than other institution^.^^ Instead of
employing a doctrinal rule, it creates a more flexible standard that it will apply
on a case by case basis.33 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the
reach of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is an example of a moderate
right?4 Rather than creating a rule that all violations of the Fourth Amendment
require suppression of evidence in all instances, the Court created a standard
which balances the "costs" of exclusion against the "benefits" derived from that
excl~sion?~
The court's workload increases because it conducts the balancing
case by case. As such, the right is weaker and there is more uncertainty about
the law.36
3. No Rights
Finally, a court can take a hands-off approach and decide not to create any
rights or remedies at all, leaving decision-making entirely to other institution^.^^
The rule that criminal defendants have no constitutional right to discovery is an
example of a doctrinal rule with no concomitant right.38 Courts frequently create
a rule without a right3' because their limited resources and personnel prevent
them fi-omreviewing all governmental action.40In the "no rights" situation, both
judicial activism and judicial activity are at their lowest?l
C. Application to Criminal Process Questions
Outside the criminal procedure context, scholars recognize comparative
institutional analysis as a useful theory for analyzing law, rights, and the role of
courts in supplying the demand for law and right^?^ However, no criminal
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 5,19.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
35. Id.
36. LAW'S LIMITS,
supra note 12,at 19.
37. Id. at 19-20.
38. See, e.g., Weatherfordv. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
39. LAW'S LIMITS,
supra note 12, at 11. ("Judges are asked to decide who will decide basic
substantivedecisions. Rather than directly addressing these substantive decisions, courts funnel most
of them elsewhere.")
40. Id. at 3,4, 176; See also Neil K . Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the
Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH.L. REV.657, 663 (1988) [hereinafterA
Job jbr Judges] ("The physical capacity of the courts to review governmental action is simply
dwarfed by the capacity of governments to produce such action."); IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIWS,
supra note 13, at 128-38;LAW'SLIMITS,
supra note 12,at 26.
41. LAW'S LIMITS,
supra note 12,at 19-20.
42. See, e.g., Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 11 (international law); Jill E. Fisch, The
Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competitionfor Corporate Charters, 68 U . CIN.L. REV.
1061 (2000) (corporate law); Daniel H. Cole, The Importance of Being Comparative, 33 IND.L.
REV. 921 (2W)(environmentallaw); Lany I. Palmer, Patient Safety, Risk Reduction, and the Law,
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process scholar explicitly utilizes comparative institutional analysis to examine
criminal process questions. Instead, some scholars are quick to propose a
doctrinal rule to serve a procedural goal without considering whether the
Others suggest
adjudicative process is best equipped to achieve that
ways in which different institutions could achieve a desired policy without
comparing the relative merits of those institution^.^^ Simply cataloging the
available institutions without engaging in any comparison amongst them leaves
unanswered the question of which institution will best serve the desired policy.
Other scholars simply ignore questions of institutional choice. This oversight is
a mistake. The comparative framework is an ideal methodology for analyzing
criminal process issues.
The lack of attention to the comparative framework by criminal process
scholars could be "animated by a deep aversion to a particular institution and a
deep conviction that the goal they have espoused will insulate them from this
ir~stitution."~~
For example, some criminal process scholars believe the political
process rarely protects the rights of criminal defendant^.^^ They are more
confident that the courts are the best champions of justice for unpopular
groups.47While evidence exists to support this view, overburdened courts may
perform no better than the malfunctioning political process to meet the demand
for rights.
The question of institutional choice often seems obvious in the criminal
36 HOUS. L. REV. 1609 (1999) (patient's rights); David S. Schwartz, The Case of the Vanishing
Protected Clms: Reflections on Reverse Discrimination, Afirmative Action, and Racial Balancing,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 657 (2000) (affirmative action); Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of
Powers, 49 DUKEL.J. 749 (1999) (separation of powers); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment
Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1645 (1996) (labor law); Arti K. Rai,
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKEFOREST
L.
REV. 827 (1999) (intellectual property); Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex
POL.
Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Peifect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP.
& Crv. RTS.L. REV. 337 (1998) (family law); Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law,
Student-Athletes, and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation,
1995 WIS.L. REV. 545 (1995) (sports law); Buzbee, supra note 14 (urban sprawl); Ted Schneyer,
Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation ofLawyers, 65 FORDHAML. REV.33 (1996) (legal
ethics); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections
on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398 (2007) (business judgment
rule).
43. See, e.g., Lenese C . Herbert, Bete Noir: How Race-Based Policing Threatens National
Security, 9 MICH.J. RACE & L. 149 (2003).
44. See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 9.
supra note 12, at 174. For the legal liberalist, mistrust of the political
45. LAW'S LIMITS,
process makes it unnecessary to analyze whether that institution would be better suited to achieve
the desired goal in certain situations. For the social norm theorist, the belief that the courts hinder
communities of color from political self-determination in attempting to control the violence in their
communities obviates the need to determine whether the adjudicativeprocess could better serve the
desires of these communities.
46. See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A
Response to the New CriminalJusiiceScholarship,87 GEO.
L.J. 1059 (1 999).
47. Id.
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process context because defendants in a criminal case are already before the
courts and will remain there until the case is resolved. Thus, the courts appear to
be the clear institutional choice to attain a desired criminal process goal. In
seeking ways to protect individual rights against government overreaching,
criminal process scholars often examine ways in which the courts can provide
the necessary protection without explicitly considering whether the courts are
the institution best equipped to do so. This decision makes sense because courts
have traditionally been the bulwark against excesses of govement power.
However, courts make institutional choices when they define the character
of rights.48 Courts may not create the strong right that is sought because of their
institutional limitations. Instead of turning blindly to the courts to address
criminal process questions, scholars must compare several alternative decisionmakers. Depending upon the goal sought, the institutions of criminal process
include the political process, the courts, the executive (including prosecutors),
defendants, juries, and administrative agencies. It is critical to examine and
compare the competence of these institutions to resolve a process issue because
this analysis may reveal that an institution other than the court is best suited to
achieve the desired policy or goal.
Achieving compulsion parity between prosecutors and defendants in their
ability to gather evidence located outside the United States is an important
criminal process goal in the era of global crime. Currently, MLATs only allow
prosecutors to obtain foreign evidence. This Article considers how the
comparative framework would approach and resolve the question of attaining
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases. Since the framework does not
address the question of goal choice?9 Part I11 discusses the importance of the
norm of compulsion parity by examining its historical and current formulations.

.

It is an "ancient proposition7'that in a trial, "the public . . has a right to
every man's evidence, except for those persons protected by a constitutional,
common-law, or statutory privilege."50 The "very integrity" of the judicial
process as well as public confidence in the system depends upon full disclosure
of evidence.51For these reasons, both prosecutors and defendants have the right
to compulsory process. Eliminating this right has the "effect of suppressing the
truth."52 To ensure that the criminal process can reliably free the innocent and
punish the guilty, both parties should have compulsion parity, for example, the
48. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 14.
50. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 708-9.
52. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,20 (1967).
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equal ability to compel the production of evidence that is relevant and material
so that it can be presented to the trier of fact.53 Subpart A addresses the
historical evolution of the norm of compulsion parity and Subpart B addresses
its current formulation.

A. Historical E~olution
Compulsion parity is a value deeply rooted in our constitutional hist01-y.~~
In England, before the establishment of coercive means for securing the
presence of favorable witnesses, innocent defendants went to their deaths.55 The
English parliament remedied this injustice in 1695 when it passed a statute
granting defendants charged with treason the same subpoena power available to
the prosecution.56 The principle of parity was well-established by the time
Blackstone wrote his Commentaries on the Laws of England shortly before the
American Revolution. He wrote, "[the defendant] shall have the same
compulsive process to bring in his witnesses for him, as was usual to compel
their appearance against him."57
The American colonists brought with them memories of the dangers of a
justice system without compulsion parity.58 William Penn's experience in
England provides a compelling example. Penn was arrested in 1670 for
delivering a sermon to an unlawful assembly of ~ u a k e r sHis
. ~ ~trial proceeded
in his absence after he was removed from the courtroom. He had attempted to
defend himself without the assistance of an attorney and without the ability to
compel the testimony of witnesses on his behalf. Penn was eventually acquitted
by a jury that ignored the judge's instructions to convict. Later, when he became
53. The international community likewise recognizes the importance of compulsion parity.
Article 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following
minimum guarantees, in full equality: (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(3)(e), entered
infoforceMar. 23, 1976,999U.N.T.S. 171. The United States became a p a q the Covenant in 1992.
54. See Akhil Amar, Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Foreward: Sixth
Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO.L. J. 641,699 (1996) ("Though the words of the Compulsory
Process Clause do not, on their face, demand a parity reading, the established Anglo-American right
that the clause meant to declare was clearly defined in terms of subpoena parity"); Richard A.
Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (1999) ("The
Compulsory Process Clause, at the very least, requires the government to permit criminal defendants
to avail themselves of the same rules of process-in the literal sense of service of process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in court-as are available to the prosecution").
55. Peter Westen, The Compulsov Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV.71,85 (1974).
56. Id. at 89. This "landmark English Treason Act of 1696 gave defendants 'the like Processe.
. . to compell their Witnesses. . as is usually granted to compell Witnesses to appeare against
them.. .."'See Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700 (citation omitted).
57. Westen, supra note 57, at 90 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 97-98 & n. 114.
59. Id.at91.
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founder of the Pennsylvania colony, Penn included both compulsory process and
compulsion parity in that state's Charter of ~iberties.~'
The provision provided
that "all criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Counsel as
their prosecutors."61
Most state constitutions protected the right to compulsory process,
including parity.62 New Jersey's State Constitution of 1776, for example, gave
the accused "'the same privileges of witnesses . . . as their prosecutors are or
shall be entitled to."63 The common principle in early American formulations of
the right to compulsory process was that defendants should have at least the
same rights as the prosecution to compel witnesses to testify on their behalf.64
Compulsory process, including parity, was so important to the states that it
~~
was protected in the Constitution under the Sixth ~ m e n d m e n t . The
Compulsory Process Clause provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor."66 Though the Clause's language does not explicitly require parity, its
history demonstrates that parity is implied. When James Madison drafted the
clause, most state provisions emphasized the defendant's right to present
evidence on a par with the prosecution. Only two states, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, emphasized the subpoena power.67 Madison, a consensus builder,
likely draRed the Clause to specifically emphasize the minority view so as to
ensure it would not be overlooked. He believed his language would implicitly
protect the "more conspicuous and common aspects of the defendant's right to
present witnesses in his favor[,]" including parity.68
60. He also included a provision in the governing laws protecting the right of defendants to
present a defense. Id. at 91-92.
61. Id. at 92-93 (citing Act of May 31, 1718, 1 Laws of Pennsylvania, ch. 236 sec. 4 (Bioren
ed. 18101.
62. Westen, supra note 57, at 90-91, 94-95; Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700.
63. Westen, supra note 57, at 95; Amar, supra note 56, at 699-700.
64. Westen, supra note 57, at 95.
65. Id. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted) ("[State provisions] all reflected the principle that the
defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least as advantageous as that possessed by the
prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his case. The states pressed the principle so
vigorously that the framers of the federal Bill of Rights included it in the sixth amendment in a
distinctive formulation of their own.").
66. For a brief discussion of the history of the Campulsory Process Clause, see Lisa Graver,
The Current Value of Compulsoty Process: Can a Defendant Compel the Admission of Favorable
Scientijic Testimony? 48 CASEW. RES.L. REV. 865,868-870(1998).
67. Westen, supra note 57, at 94-95 nn.96 & 99.
68. Id. at 99-100. The language of the compulsory process clause was widely publicized. If
state representatives from the majority states had thought the language was narrowly limited to the
subpwna power, they likely would have raised the issue. Id. at 100.None did because of their belief
that Madison's language was implicitly as broad as their comparable state provisions. Id.
When the first congress statutorily implemented the compulsory process clause in 1790, it gave the
clause a broader meaning than the subpoena power. Id. The statute provided that a person accused of
treason:

CONVICTING THE INNOCENT

B. Current Formulation
There are very few cases construing the Sixth Amendment's compulsory
process clause. Washington v. Texas is the first.69 In Washington, two Texas
statutes barred persons charged or convicted as co-participants in the same crime
from testifying for each other. However, the statute did not bar their testimony
on behalf of the prosecution because of the belief that co-accuseds would lie
only when called by the defense. Finding this reasoning arbitrary, the Court held
that Washington was denied his compulsory process right to put a witness on the
stand whose testimony would be relevant and material to the defense.70 In so
holding, Chief Justice Warren wrote,
[Tlhe Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically to provide that
defendants in criminal cases should be provided the means of obtaining witnesses
so that their own evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be evaluated by the
jury. 71

shall be allowed and admitted in his said defence to make any proof that he or they
can produce, by lawful witness or witnesses, and shall have like process of the court
where he or they shall be tried, to compel his or their witnesses to appear at his or their
trial, as is usually granted to compel witnesses to appear on the prosecution against
them.
Act of April 30, 1790, ch 9,29, 1 Stat. 112, 119, cited in Richard A. Nagareda, supra note
56, at 1117.
Westen concludes, "compulsory process by 1791 represented the culmination of a long-evolving
principle that the defendant should have a meaningful opportunity, at least on a par with that of the
prosecution, to present a case in his favor through witnesses." Westen, supra note 57, at 77-78.
According to Wigmore, in his Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, the reference to "compulsory
process" in the Sixth Amendment "provided nothing new or exceptional"; it merely "gave solid
sanction, in the special case of accused persons, to the procedure ordinarily practised and recognized
for witnesses in general." 3 John Henry Wigmore, A TREATISE
ON THE SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE
IN
TRIALSAT COMMON
LAW2190,2965 (1st ed. 1904).
69. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
70. Id. at 23.
.
71. Id. at 20. In his concurrence in Washington, Justice Harlan viewed the case, not as one
implicating compulsory process rights, but rather, one implicating due process guarantees. He
concluded that the Texas statute violated due process because the State recognized the relevance and
competence of a co-accused's testimony, but arbitrarily barred the defendant from being able to use
this testimony. Id. at 23. As with the compulsory process clause, non-arbitrary exclusion of defense
evidence does not violate due process. See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1976) ("The
introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the State for a 'valid' reason.. .").
When defendants are deprived of their ability to present a defense, absent a persuasive reason, the
courts have found a violation of due process, see, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972);
compulsory process, see, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. 14; or both, see, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683 (1986). In Crane, the state was able to present the defendant's confession but the defense
was excluded from presenting evidence that would have tested the confession. Because neither the
judge nor the prosecution could provide a rational justification for the exclusion, due process and
compulsory process were violated. Id. at 690, 691. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987),
Ritchie claimed he was prevented from learning the names of witnesses in his favor as well as other
evidence because of the trial court's failure to disclose the contents of an agency's child abuse file.
He claimed entitlement to the State's assistance in uncovering arguably useful information. The
Court stated that the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause to this type
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The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that compulsion parity is
required by the Compulsory Process Clause. However, the Court acknowledges
that the Clause's history reflects the Framers' intent to provide an accused with
rights equal to that of the prosecution to compel witnesses and evidence.72
The Compulsory Process Clause is an essential safeguard for protecting the
innocent and pursuing the truth in our adversarial system of criminal justice.73 It
not only grants defendants the right to compel witnesses to appear, but also the
right to present their testimony74 and to compel documentary and physical
evidence.75 The Clause implicitly requires parity between defendants and
of claim was unsettled. Instead, the Court adopted a due process analysis since its precedents
addressing fundamental fairness of trials established a clear framework for the analysis. The Court
stated, "[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the
government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt." Id, at 56. It does not
matter whether it is the prosecution (see, e.g., Crane, 476 U.S. 673), the judge (see, e.g., Webb, 409
U.S. 95), or a statute (see, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. 14, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973)) that denies defendants their ability to present a defense. The denial still violates due process.
72. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 n. 13 (1988) (citing Westen, The
Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV.71, 94-95 (1974) (footnotes omitted) ("[State
provisions] all reflected the principle that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity, at least
as advantageous as that possessed by the prosecution, to establish the essential elements of his case.
The states pressed the principle so vigorously that the framers of the federal Bill of Rights included
it in the sixth amendment in a distinctive formulation of their own.")). In Taylor, the Court upheld a
trial court's order precluding a defense witness because of the lawyer's failure to give the
government sufficient notice of his witness as required by statute. The Court found that witness
preclusion under the circumstances of this case did not violate the Compulsory Process Clause.
However, the Court did acknowledge:
[Tlhe conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to
have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and weight of such
testimony to Ibe determined by the jury or by the court. . . [W]e believe that [this]
reasoning [is] required by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 408 (citation omitted)(edits in original).
73. See Amar, supra note 56, at 642 (1996) ("The deep principles underlying the Sixth
Amendment's three clusters and many clauses [and, I submit, underlying constitutional criminal
procedure generally] are the protection of innocence and the pursuit of truth.").
74. Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 (The framers of the Sixth Amendment "did not intend to
commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he had no right to use.").
75. The use of the word "witnesses" in the Clause includes both witnesses who furnish
evidence through testimony as well as those who furnish evidence by producing documents and
other items. See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-55 (2000) (Thomas, J. concurring).
According to Justice Thomas, this "broad view of the term 'witness' in the compulsory process
context dates back at least to the beginning of the 18th century. Id. at 54 n.4 (citation omitted). See
also United States v. Bun; 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CCD Va. 1807), cited with approval in
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 54-55. During his treason trial, Aaron Burr sought the issuance of a subpoena
duces Cecum to compel President Jefferson to provide the letter that purported to contain
incriminating evidence against Burr. Chief Justice Marshall, presiding as a circuit judge, rejected the
government's argument that the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause only permitted the
defendant to compel witness testimony, but not documents. The court held that the right to
compulsory process included the right to secure papers material to the defense. Id. at 55.
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prosecutors. However, as discussed in Part IVYthe norm of compulsion parity
has not kept pace with the rise of global crime76 as a result of the powerful
MLAT.
IV.
MUTUAL
LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
TREATIES
AND THE RETRENCHMENT OF
COMPULSION
PARITY
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are bi-lateral treaties that facilitate the
gathering of evidence from foreign locales. However, MLATs fail to achieve
accuracy and reliability in criminal adjudications because they create
transnational compulsory process solely for prosecutors. Subpart A discusses the
necessity of MLATs in an era of global crime and Subpart B describes their
function.
A. Necessity of MLATs
Long before the global war on terror began in earnest after the events of
September 11, the exponential growth of transnational crime was a government
concern.77 That concern has not abated. In a June 2006 speech in Israel, former
76. Advances in technology and modes of travel facilitate the commission of crimes across
international borders. See Nancy Guffey-Landers, Establishing an International Criminul Court:
Will it do Justice?, 20 MD. J . INT'L
L. & TRADE199 (1996) (arguing that technology and advanced
modes of travel have increased the possibility of crimes being committed across borders such as
drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and human rights violations). Drug trafficking, money
laundering, and international organized crime are just a few of the crimes that are increasingly
perpetrated on global scale. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Time for
Final Action on 18 U.S.C. sec 3292,21 MICH.J. INT'LL. 941,946 (2000) (establishing that the three
factors most cited for explaining the growing globalization of crime are narcotics, banking secrecy
and technology); Ellen Podger, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime,
34 AM. CRIM.L. REV. 325 (1997) (discussing the expansion of federal white collar prosecutions
involving international activities); Thomas G. Snow, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: The
Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime, International challenge.^ and the Legal Tools
Available to Address Them, 11 W M .& MARYBILL RTS.J. 209, 209-210 (2002) (noting that
contemporary white collar crime is now a transnational crime because of increased use of
international financial systems to commit the crime); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Particularly in the past decade, our Government has sought,
successfully, to hold foreign nationals criminally liable under federal laws for conduct committed
entirely beyond the territorial limits of the United States that nevertheless has effects in this
country."). See also Christopher M. Pilkerton, The Bite of the Apple: The Use of Narcotics-Related
103 (2001) ("The
Foreign Wiretap Evidence in New York City Courts, 11 INT'L LEGALPERSP.
global trade of drug trafficking currently poses the most serious threat U.S. law enforcement has
ever had to combat.").
77. See, e.g., The White House, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMECONTROLSTRATEGY
15-25 (1998)
(describing international crime threat resulting from transnational drug trafficking, smuggling of
illegal goods and undocumented immigrants, money laundering, and piracy of intellectual property)
cited in Diane Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an
Infernational Context, 75 IND.L.J. 809,820 n.75 (2000). Former Attorney General Dick Thornburgh
stated, "Often, more than 50 percent of my day is devoted to some matter relating to our
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Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales articulated a vision that remains
committed to stomping out transnational crime:
[Dlespite the tremendous demands on the Department in the post-911 1 world, our
commitment to fighting crime has never been stronger. We are cooperating with
our intemational partners to fight everything from organized crime and drug
trafficking to cybercrime, human trafficking, corruption and intellectual property
crimes. We are working as a team, and we are making good progress.78

Domestic prosecution of transnational crime presents challenges. The
parties commonly require evidence located in a foreign jurisdiction in a form
admissible in American courts. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials on the
one hand and accused individuals on the other must both contend with issues of
national sovereignty and alien legal systems that impede their ability to acquire
that evidence. When evidence necessay to effectively prosecute or defend is
located in a foreign jurisdiction, there exist two significant hurdles to obtaining
it. The first obstacle is the need to respect sovereignty. Absent a treaty or other
agreement between nations, the jurisdiction of law enforcement agents does not
extend beyond a nation's borders.79 Laws often forbid unilateral law
enforcement activities by foreign agents.80 Beyond U.S. borders, American
subpoenas for evidence have no effect. Hence, sovereignty hinders law
enforcement's ability to gather and seize foreign evidence.
The second obstacle is the difficulty of harmonizings1 different legal
systems, cultures, and customs. For example, nations differ in the acts they
decide to ~riminalize,~~
the techniques law enforcement can utilize,83 the laws
international involvement in fighting drug trafficking, money laundering, intemational organized
crime and business fraud, environmental depredations, terrorism or espionage." Address by Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh, American Bar Association annual meeting (Aug. 8, 1989), quofed in
Michael Burke, United States v. Salim: A Harbinger for Federal Prosecutions Using Depositions
Taken Abroad, 39 CATH.U. L. REV. 895, n.4 (1990).
78. Excerpted from Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at Malka
Brender Hall "Kes Hamishpat" Trubowitz Law Building, Tel Aviv University (June 27, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2OO6/ag~speech~O6O627.ht~.
79. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 5.
80. Id. at 5,331. See, e.g., Art. 271 of the Swiss Penal Code (cited in NADELMANN,
supra note
10, at 331 n.47):
Whoever, on Swiss territory, without being authorized so to do, takes on behalf of a
foreign government any action which is solely within the province of a [Swiss]
government authority or a [Swiss] government official, whoever does anything to
encourage such action, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment, in serious cases in the
penitentiary. . . .
For a discussion of similar restrictions in other nations, see Sharon DeVine and Christine
M.Olsen. Taking Evidence Outside of the UnitedStafes,55 B.U. L. REV.368,386 (1975).
81. Nadelmann describes harmonization as a concept that incorporates three processes: the
"replarization of relations among law enforcement officials of different states, [the]
accommodation among systems that retain their essential differences, and [the] homogenization of
systems toward a common norm." NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 10 (emphasis in original).
82. Many American tax and securities law violations are not criminal in other nations.
83. Typical techniques used in the United States such as wire-tapping and undercover
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and legal procedures available for obtaining evidence, and the infrastructures
governing whether evidence will be provided. MLATs were negotiated with
foreign nations to overcome these obstacles.

B. Function of ML,ATs
MLATs create transnational compulsory process between nations.84 They
are bi-lateral in order to specifically tailor each treaty to account for differing
legal systems and law enforcement prioritie~.'~MLATs mandate mutual
cooperation between nations in the investigation and prosecution of
transnational crime. The parties can deny assistance only on the bases explicitly
set forth in the treaty.86 The primary motivation of the United States to negotiate
operations are either forbidden or strictly constrained elsewhere. Id. at 7, 209, 225-235, 239-246.
Many civil law countries operate under the "legality principle," requiring the prosecution of anyone
known to have committed a crime, and preventing law enforcement from turning individuals into
informants. See id. at 216,218-19.
84. MLATs are not the sole means of obtaining evidence abroad. Executive agreements can
provide limited assistance to investigate specified types of crimes. Executive agreements with
foreign governments are signed by the President without Senate ratification and bind the country.
See U.S. CONST.art. 11, $2; Guffey-Landers, supra note 78, at 209.
In addition to MLATs and executive agreements, various multilateral arrangements exist. For
example, the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances provides for mutual legal assistance in Article 7. This treaty entered into force in 1988.
Under the Convention, a nation may request mutual legal assistance for the following reasons:
Taking evidence or statements from persons; effecting service of judicial documents;
executing searches and seizures; examining objects and sites; providing information
and evidentiary items; providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents
and records, including bank, financial, corporate or business records; identifying or
tracing proceeds, properly, instrumentalities or other things for evidentiary purposes.
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, art. 7(2), openedfor signature Dec. 20, 1988,28 I.L.M. 493,508. The UN Convention
is silent as to the ability of criminal defendants to use the treaty to obtain evidence on their behalf.
See Michael Abbell, DOJ Renews Assault on Defendant's Right to Use Treaties to Obtain Evidence
from
Abroad,
THE CHAMPION,
AUG. 21,
1997, at
21,
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/champio11/axtic1es/97aug02.htm. These other methods are of limited utility
because they only cover certain specified crimes.
85. Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against SelfIncrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1201, 1265 (1998) ("[MLATs] help us
bridge the gulfs of language, culture and disparate legal systems that in the past hampered
cooperation in criminal law enforcement" and thus "have vastly improved international collaboration
in combating crime"); Abraham Abramovsky, Prosecuting the "Russian Maja": Recent Russian
Legislation and Increased Bilateral Cooperation May Provide the Means, 37 VA. J . INT'LL. 191,
207 (1996). MLATs were structured to streamline and make more effective the process of obtaining
foreign evidence. See Treaty with Austria on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, US.Austria, at 2, S. Exec. Rep. No. 104-24 (1996) [hereinafter Austria] citing Worldwide Review of
Status of US. Extradition Treaties and Mutual LegaZ Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong. 36-37 (1987) (statement of Mark M. Richard,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division).
86. Each MLAT explicitly sets forth the situations in which the requested country can deny
assistance under the treaty, usually in Article 3. Typically, they allow for the denial of requests that
appear to involve military or political offenses not recognized under the criminal laws of the

82

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 26:1

these treaties is to facilitate obtaining foreign evidence in a form admissible in
United States courts.87
While each MLAT is the product of individual negotiation^,^^ they do
contain some similarities. MLATs typically provide for the taking of testimony,
the production of records, evidence, and information, the service of judicial
orders, and the transfer of persons in custody for testimonial purposes.89
MLATs also permit any other assistance not prohibited by the laws of the
requested nation, allowing the treaties to evolve over timcgO
MLATs call for the creation of a "Central Authority" in each nation to
facilitate treaty requeskgl By making requests directly to the Central Authority,
the courts and diplomatic channels are avoided, and the time required to secure
evidence is significantly reduced.92The Office of International Affairs (OIA) in
the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice serves as the
Central Authority for the United
The OIA was created in 1979, after
requested state or that would violate the constitution of the requested state. They also permit denials
when the request would violate the national security or basic public policy of the requested state.
87. A significant motivation for foreign nations' willingness to negotiate MLATs was a desire
to reduce unilateral actions taken by the United States to obtain evidence. See, e.g., NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 367 (description of Canadian MLAT).
88. For an in-depth discussion of the negotiation history, see id, at 345-384; Tuerkheimer,
supra note 9, at 358.
89. Some types of assistance, such as the transfer of persons in custody for testimonial
purposes, were not always available through other processes like the diplomatic letters rogatory. The
types of assistance required by an MLAT are usually documented in the first Article. See, e.g.,
Austria, supra note 87, at 6, providing for the following types of assistance: (1) the taking of
testimony or statements of persons; (2) service of documents; (3) execution of requests for searches
and seizures; (4) the provision of documents and other articles of evidence; (5) locating and
identifying persons; and (6) the transfer of individuals in order to obtain testimony or for other
purposes. The earliest treaties, like the one with Switzerland, allowed the denial of assistance if the
crime was not specifically enumerated in the treaty. Hanis, Asia Crime Prevention Foundation
(ACPF) Lecture: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Necessity, Merits, and Problems Arising in the
Negotiation Process (2000) [hereinafter Harris Lecture]. Experience proved this limitation to be too
restrictive, so later treaties included the requirement of dual criminality (the act committed would be
an offense in both jurisdictions). This too proved to be too restrictive. Most current treaties do not
provide dual criminality as a basis for denial of assistance. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Treaty for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., art. 28, May 25,
1973,27 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT].
supra note 10, at 319. See Austria, supra note 87, at 1. The process for
92. NADELMANN,
MLAT requests is incorporated in 28 U.S.C. $ 1782.
93. The Central Authority for the United States is the Attorney General or his designee. See,
e.g., Austria, supra note 87, at 14. The OIA was designated as the Central Authority for purposes of
making and receiving MLAT requests pursuant to 28 C.F.R. $ 0.64-1. This section states:
The Assistant Attomey General, Criminal Division . . . shall have the authority and
perform the functions of the "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority" (or like
designation) under treaties and executive agreements between the United States of
America and other countries on mutual assistance in criminal matters that designate
the Attorney General or the Department of Justice as such authority. The Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, is authorized to re-delegate this authority to the
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the first MLAT was signed.94 Every U.S. Attorney's Office in the country has
an "international security coordinator" who is responsible for handling requests
to or from foreign natiomg5
MLATs have many advantages. First, evidence can be obtained quickly
because requests bypass the courts and diplomatic channels.96 Second, MLATs
establish a procedural framework for ensuring that the evidence will be
admissible in domestic courts.97 Third, they can provide a mechanism for
circumventing the financial secrecy laws that so often frustrate American
inve~ti~ations?~
Without MLATs, frustration with these laws frequently leads
the United States to resort to unilateral actions to obtain foreign evidence.99
Fourth, MLATs can require that the request and the evidence provided be kept

Deputy Assistant Attorneys General, Criminal Division, and to the Director and
Deputy Directors of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division.
The
OIA
negotiates
MLATs
with
the
State
Department.
www.usdoj.gov/criminals/oia.html.The staff of OIA consists of nearly eighty men and women in
Washington, D.C. as well as attorneys and associated staff in six foreign countries. Harris Lecture,
supra note 91. On any given day, they handle about 6,000 requests to and from the US, about two
thirds of which are requests for mutual assistance. Id. The number of requests grows every year. Id.
The OIA helps local, state and federal prosecutors make MLAT requests. They will provide model
MANUAL,
Title 9, Criminal Resource
requests and help with drafting. UNITEDSTATESA'ITORNEYS'
Manual 276 (1997). Once a draft is complete, the OIA sends the final request to the requested
country's Central Authority. Id. Usually, the OIA will only send the request after it has been
translated. Id.
94. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 342. The first MLAT was negotiated with the Swiss. See
infra notes 182-212 and accompanying text.
95. UNITEDSTATESATTORNEY'SMANUAL,§ 9-90.050 (2004). Any local, state or federal
prosecutor who needs overseas evidence can make an MLAT request. To make the request, the
prosecutor contacts an OIA attorney who will work with the prosecutor to draft the request. Snow,
supra note 78 at 227-28.
Requests must generally be in writing, though more recent treaties allow requests in another form in
urgent circumstances. Requests must contain: the name of the authority conducting the investigation;
a description of the evidence sought and the purpose for which it is sought; applicable legal
provisions (with their texts), the name and location of the persons sought, and any procedures for
obtaining or authenticating the foreign evidence that will assist in its admissibility in the U.S. Id. at
n.70. After the request is translated, the OIA forwards the MLAT request directly to the other
country's Central Authority. Many countries have statutes which provide procedures for responding
to foreign MLAT requests. Similar to the process followed in the United States, foreign prosecutors
will obtain subpoenas or other compulsory orders from their courts. Once the requested evidence is
obtained, it is returned by the Central Authority of the requested country to the OIA. The OIA then
forwards the evidence directly to the prosecutor. Id. The evidence gathered generally cannot be used
for purposes other than those stated in the request without the prior consent of the requested State.
Some treaties permit the use of information for any purpose once it becomes public. Id.
96. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Pisani) ("[Rlequests made via
MLATs can often be turned around and received in a matter of weeks, and, in some cases, even
shorter.").
supra note 10, at 319.
97. NADELMANN,
98. Id.
99. See infia notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
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confidential,loOpreventing suspects from learning of the request and attempting
to hide, obscure, or destroy evidence. Fifth, they can permit requests to be made
prior to the institution of criminal proceedings. This allows administrative
agencies and grand juries to request evidence under the treaty.lo1 Sixth, MLATs
can require the provision of evidence in cases where no "dual criminality"lo2
exists.
Despite their many advantages, MLATs contain one serious flaw. The vast
majority explicitly exclude criminal defendants from the benefits of the
compulsory process provisions. Prosecutors are guaranteed access to foreign
evidence while defendants are not.
As of October 1, 2005, the United States has signed 61 MLATs and the
number continues to grow.lo3 All but the three earliest contain language
restricting defense access.lo4This is significant because MLATs are negotiated
with those nations that pose a significant .transnational crime problem. As su.
result, in the majority of cases where defendants require foreign evidence to
100. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 319. The United States wanted to limit the amount of
information necessary to support an MLAT request to prevent targets from learning of the
investigation and trying to undermine United States' evidence gathering efforts by either legal
recourse or illicit intimidation and bribery. Id. at 361. These efforts were not always successful. The
Swiss treaty, for example, requires that "[u]pon receipt of a request for assistance, the requested
State shall notify . . . any person from whom a statement or testimony or documents, records, or
articles of evidence are sought;" See Swiss MLAT, supra note 93, at art. 36(a). This provision warns
suspects that they are under investigation at an earlier stage of the investigation than is required
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, giving them greater opportunitiesto shift their funds
and otherwise hide evidence. Another problematic provision from the point of view of the United
States requires that requests for assistance include not only "the subject matter and nature of the
investigation or proceeding" but also "a description of the essential acts alleged or sought to be
ascertained"; see id. Art. 29(l)(a). As a consequence of this provision, suspects learn the
prosecution's theory at an early stage in the investigation. In the United States, the defendant often
does not discover that theory until the indictment. The United States was successful in maintaining
secrecy in the Italian MLAT. That treaty contains a provision allowing the United States to request
that the application for assistance and the contents of the request remain confidential. See Treaty
Between the United States and Italy on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Together with
a Related Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Italy, art. 8(2), Nov. 9, 1982, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Treaty Doc. 98-25, [hereinafter Italian MLAT].
101. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 332.
102. Id. at 333. Dual criminality refers to behavior that is criminal in both jurisdictions. Id. at 67.
103. As of September28,2009, these countries include: Anguilla, AntigualBarbuda, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Belguim, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Canada,
Cayman Islands, Columbia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, European Union,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Montserrat,
Morocco, Netherlands, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, St. Kitts-Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE,TRAVEL.STATE.GOV,
BUREAUOF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS,MUTUALLEGALASSISTANCE
(MLAT)AND OTHERAGREEMENTS,
http://~vel.state.g0v/law/info/judicia~judicial~69O.html.
104. The three earliest MLATs are the Swiss, Turkish and Netherlands treaties.
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defend themselves, they are forced to rely upon inefficient market processeslo5
while the government obtains evidence pursuant to the treaty. This creates a
significant compulsion disparity in transnational criminal cases.

v.
COMPARING
THE INSTITUTIONS
The four institutions that can play a role in protecting the norm of
compulsion parity are the evidence-gathering market, the political process, the
executive, and the courts. Each has its own merits and shortcomings. Only by
comparing institutional capabilities is it possible to make an informed choice
amongst them. Since the relevant decision-makers are the same, many of the
factors considered are transferable to other criminal process questions. The
Subparts below examine each institution's competence to safeguard parity either
singly or in conjunction with another institution.
A.

The Marketfor Foreign Evidence

Without MLATs, parties struggle to obtain foreign evidence because it is
beyond the reach of domestic subpoenas. Law enforcement and defendants
utilize either informal methods, such as cooperation and unilateral actions, or a
formal diplomatic process called letters rogatory to obtain foreign evidence.
Though far from perfect, these processes make up an informal community or
market that represents a viable institutional choice for attaining the goal of equal
access to evidence between prosecutors and defendants. What follows is an
examination of this market. Comparative institutional analysis necessitates this
exploration because one option for eliminating the compulsion disparity that
currently exists between the prosecution and the defense is a return to the preMLAT world.
1.

Informal Evidence Gathering

American law enforcement agents abroad often develop informal,
cooperative relationships with their foreign counterparts. By working closely
with their foreign equivalents, they can conduct investigations and obtain
evidence while avoiding accusations that they are performing investigative
operations normally reserved for employees of a sovereign. Cooperation often
takes place below the radar of high level government officials so as not to be
hindered by government policies.106 High level officials pay attention only
105. See infra notes 108-142 and accompanying text.
106. This is a notion advanced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr. called
"transgovernmental relations." See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., Transgovernmental
Relations and International Organizations, WORLDPOLITICS 27, 43 (1974) (referring to "sets of
direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided
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when the activities of agents or prosecutors "assume political significance,
attract media attention or threaten to disrupt other dimensions of a state's foreign
relations."lo7
Despite significant obstacles, cooperation and internationalization of
policing has made great strides. American law enforcement agencies have
increased their presence in foreign nations. For example, legal attaches operate
as overseas agents of the ~ ~ 1They
. handle
l ~ all
~ international matters that fall
within the FBI's jurisdictionlog and their presence facilitates informal
cooperation. Legal attaches do not typically investigate criminal matters. Rather,
they work as liaisons between American and foreign law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors,110 playing a crucial role in cutting through red tape and
expediting requests to and from the United States for information and
evidence.ll1 Other law enforcement agencies such as the D E A ~
l2 and the Secret
Service also have an international presence that facilitates cooperation.113
Additionally, the United States' office of Interpol assists with communications
between the United States and foreign police agencies.'14
Cooperative arrangements are not always possible, however, because they
depend upon dual criminality1l5 and similar law enforcement priorities. Absent
informal cooperation, American law enforcement officials sometimes resort to
three forms of unilateral action. First, law enforcement officials attempt to
operate as private investigators rather than as representatives of a foreign
sovereign.l16 This option is often problematic. Regardless of whether agents
exercise their sovereign powers to arrest and the like, they are still employees of
a foreign nation. Most nations do not take kindly to unilateral operations by
foreign law enforcement and many have laws prohibiting such activity.l l7 Also,
local law enforcement agents may resent foreign agents operating on their
turf.ll They may report the activity to high level government officials, creating

by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments") cited in
supra note 10, at 107-9.
107. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 108.
108. Id. at 150.
109. Id. at 152.
110. Id.at152-3.
111. Id, at 153.
112. Id. at 147-150.
113. Id. at 164-167.

NADELMANN,

114. Id.atl81.
115. For example, joint investigations of securities law violations are hampered by the fact that
many of these violations simply are not criminal acts in other countries. Id. at 6-7.
116. Id. at 8.
117. For example, in many nations, laws forbid foreign agents from carrying firearms and even
preclude them fiom conducting interviews and carrying out other investigative inquiries on their
own. Id. at 190.
118. See id. at 108-9.
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friction between the nations.'19 Second, unilateral action also takes the form of
pressuring foreign nations to accommodate U.S. law enforcement needs.120
Finally, in rare cases, unilateral actions involve bribery of foreign officials121
and a b d ~ c t i 0 n s . lAs
~ ~ can be imagined, these unilateral measures lead to
international friction.123
The same obstacles that hinder transnational criminal investigations can
sometimes provide benefits to criminals. Successfully investigating and
obtaining transnational evidence for prosecution is difficult. Transnational
lawbreakers often take advantage of the lack of cooperation between nations and
investigatory hindrances.124 For example, offenders can hide the proceeds of
their criminal activity in foreign bank accounts, safe in the knowledge that
blocking statutes, designed specifically to limit the availability of financial
documents and records, will hamper prosecutors' efforts to obtain important
evidence.125 The hurdles prosecutors face in obtaining foreign evidence often
lead them to forgo prosecution.126 For the transnational offender, "foreign
territories and alien systems offer safe havens, lucrative smuggling
opportunities, and legal shields and thickets to disguise their criminal

119. This occurred in a case in which the author was involved. Police off~cersfrom Washington
State located and interviewed witnesses living in Canada without the prior permission or cooperation
of local Canadian police. The local police learned of the unilateral police activity and reported it to
high level government officials, resulting in friction between Canada and the United States.
120. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 7. One form of pressure the United States was able to exert
resulted from the growth of multinational corporations doing business in the United States. Foreign
corporations operating in the United States were susceptible to court orders and subpoenas served
upon their branches and personnel. Id. at 316. One well-known case, United States. v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), arose from such a situation. See injk note 140. When fines
are levied against domestic branches for failing to comply with subpoenas for records existing in the
foreign branches of these corporations, foreign nations often respond to this unilateral financial
pressure by agreeing to cooperate and providing the requested records. NADELMANN,
supra note 10,
at 358-9. Another form of unilateral action taken by the United States was the use of Ghidoni
waivers. See generally Harvey M . Silets and Susan W. Brenner, Compelled Consent: An Ox.vmoron
with Sinister Consequencesfor Citizens Who Patronize Foreign Banking Institutions, 20 CASEW .
RES. J. INT'LL. 435 (1988).These waivers allow a court to order a grand jury target to sign a consent
form waiving any bank secrecy privilege. Id. at 435-436.
supra note 10, at 323.
121. NADELMANN,
122. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
123. For example, international tensions arose between the United States and the United
Kingdom when prosecutors began serving subpoenas upon local branches of multinational
corporations, commonly referred to as "Bank of Nova Scotia subpoenas" (referencing well-known
cases involving such subpoenas). Civil fines are imposed for failures to comply. See infra note 140.
To resolve the tension, the Justice Department ordered that all subpoenas to institutions in the United
States for records located abroad be cleared through the Department. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at
359-360. This became known as "the Jensen memorandum" after Associate Attorney General D.
Lowell Jensen. Id. at 360.
supra note 10, at 324.
124. NADELMANN,
125. Id. at 314,324.
126. Id. at 322-23.
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enterprises."127
However, when criminal defendants require foreign evidence to defend
themselves, they often face challenges more acute than those of law enforcement
and prosecutors. Defendants cannot informally ally with law enforcement
communities in other nations to aid in investigations. They cannot take
advantage of the diplomatic pressures that governments exert to facilitate
cooperation.128And, while they can obtain personal records and evidence such
as their own financial documents or telephone records by requesting them
directly from foreign institutions,129they cannot obtain other types of evidence
through informal mechanisms except perhaps through bribery or other corrupt
means.
Both the government and defendants can hire private investigators.130
These investigators can operate abroad without raising sovereignty concerns.
Law enforcement reliance on private investigators has decreased, though, as
cooperation and harmonization among governments has increased.131 However,
defendants still rely upon them, as long as they have sufficient funds to hire
them.
2.

Formal Evidence Gathering: Letters Rogatory

The primary formal method available to prosecutors and defendants for
obtaining foreign evidence in the absence of an MLAT is a process called letters
rogatory.132The letters rogatory procedure requires the party seeking foreign
evidence or other assistance to submit a formal request through diplomatic

127. Id. at 6. The United State was concerned with the protection organized crime received
from financial secrecy jurisdictions like Switzerland. Id. at 324. Despite serious efforts, law
enforcement and prosecutors were unable to obtain financial evidence from these jurisdictions. Id.
128. Id. at 109.
129. For example, under the laws of the Cayman Islands, disclosure of bank records is generally
prohibited unless the customer consents or the Cayman Grand Court orders disclosure. See
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law
(1995
Revision),
available
at
<http:l/broadhurstbarristers.com!htm~aws.html~.

130. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 17, 99-100. One of the largest private detective agencies
was the Pinkerton Detective Agency, whose principal client between 1890 and 1892was the federal
government. Id. at 49, 55-58. When the agency was investigated in 1892 for its role in suppressing
the Homestead strike, Congress passed a law forbidding the use of private detectives to enforce
federal law. Id. at 49, (citing HOMER CUMMINGS and CARL MCFARLAND,
FEDERAL
JUSTICE:
CHAPTERS
IN THE HISTORYOF JUSTICE
AND THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE
373 (Macmillan 1937)). This
did not stop the federal government from hiring private detectives. Pinkerton agents were hired by
the State Department to hunt down Robert LeRoy Parker and Henry Longbaugh, aka Butch Cassidy
supra note 10, at 60. Most historians
and the Sundance Kid, in the jungles of Bolivia. NADELMANN,
agree that the agency was responsiblefor their deaths. Id. at 60 and note 141.
131. Id. at 22,101-02.
132. 28 U.S.C. 5 1781 (1970) (giving courts the discretionary authority to grant and receive
judicial assistance to and from a foreign court through letters rogatory).
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channels from a domestic c o u r t to a foreign court.133 Letters rogatory are
problematic for a number of reasons. First, formal judicial proceedings are a
prerequisite to the use of letters rogatory.134Hence, the procedure provides little
assistance to prosecutors seeking evidence prior to instituting proceedings.
Second, the procedure creates no obligation among nations to provide the
requested evidence.135If a country responds to a request, it is simply as a matter
of comity.136 Even if a response is forthcoming, it frequently takes years.137
Third, the procedure can be used to request a foreign court to compel the
133. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 318; Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory, 14
I.L.M. 339 (1975) (entered into force Aug. 27, 1988), at art. 5, cited in Abraham Abramovsky &
Jonathan I. Edelstein, Timefor Final Action on 18 U.S.C. see. 3292, 21 MICH.J. INT'L L. 941, 947
(2000) (providing that letters rogatory must be certified by a diplomatic or consular agency); David
Whedbee, The Faint Shadow ojthe Sixth Amendment: Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering
Capacity Abroad Under the U.S.-P.R.C. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters,
12 PAC.RIM L. & POL'YJ. 561,570 (2003).
134. At least one court has allowed the issuance of a letter rogatory in support of grand jury
proceedings. United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971). However, many common law
countries will refuse to respond to a request made before formal charges have been filed. See
ABBELL& RISTAU,supra note 9, 512-4-3, at 132 note 1. See also NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at
322 (many countries reject letters rogatory requests coming from grand juries.)
135. See &BELL & RISTAu, supra note 9, $12-3-3, at 87-88. Upon reviewing a request, the
foreign court, at its discretion, may choose then to issue orders to the appropriate authority in its
country asking it to produce the requested evidence. Id. at 88. See also Whedbee, supra note 135, at
570. Foreign courts are often reluctant to obtain evidence for criminal proceedings in another
country and many lack officials specifically charged with responding to requests. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 322.
(THIRD)OF FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW 5 101 cmt. e (1978). The
136. See RESTATEMENT
meaning of the comity doctrine remains unclear. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32
HARV.INT'L L.J. 1, 1, 3 (1991) (noting comity has been variously defined as "a rule of choice of
law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a moral necessity,
expediency, reciprocity or 'considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining
amicable and workable relationship between nations."'). In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895), the Supreme Court noted comity "in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other;" Instead, it is "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience."
137. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 166 (testimony of Pisani) ("[Elven with countries
where we have the best of relations, it takes an average of 6 months now to have a return on a letters
rogatory. That is far too long in the Twentieth Century to wait."). In a lecture given in 2000 in Japan,
the Director of the OIA stated, "Too often, however, the letter process is not very successful, and the
prosecutor or police officer who generates a letter rogatory may wait many frustrating months, or
years, only to find that the requested evidence is not produced. We have many cases in which
evidence sought by letters rogatory is supplied long after the trial for which it was requested has
been completed." Harris Lecture, supra note 91. See also Abramovsky & Edelstein, Timefor Final
Action on 18 U.S.C. 5 3292, 21 MICH.J. INT'LL. 941, 949 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-907,2d Sess.
(1984)), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3578; Worldwide Review of Status qf U.S.
Extradition Treaties and MufuaZ Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the House C o r n . On
Foreign Aflairs, 100th Cong. 36-37 (1987) (discussing the use of letters rogatory and their
limitations as compared to MLATs). If a defendant is in custody, the long wait for evidence that may
never arrive pursuant to a letter rogatory may raise Sixth Amendment speedy trial concerns,
especially in cases where the prosecution has an existing MLAT with the country from which the
evidence is sought.

90

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 26: 1

testimony of foreign witnesses, to obtain permission to interview witnesses, and
to obtain documents.138However, evidence gathered may not be in a form
admissible in American courts. Due to the inadequacies of the process, letters
rogatory are often replaced by informal evidence gathering.139When countries
fail to provide evidence under letters rogatory, the United States frequently
resorts to unilateral actions both to obtain the evidence and to pressure the other
nation into negotiating MLATS.'~'
Although informal law enforcement cooperation and the letters rogatory
process are not ideal methods for obtaining evidence,141 neither party is
guaranteed access to foreign evidence. In other words, evidence gathering parity
exists in the market. While this solution is by no means ideal, comparative
institutional analysis teaches that no institutional choice is perfect. If the goal of
achieving compulsion parity is important to the fair functioning of our criminal
justice system, as this Article argues, difficult institutional choices and
compromises must be made. A return to the pre-MLAT market represents a
viable means of achieving compulsion parity, and must be considered alongside
the political process, the executive, and the courts.
B. The Political Process
Another institution that can play a role in protecting the norm of
compulsion parity is the political process, namely, the Senate. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee takes testimony from interested parties regarding
treaties and issues reports to the full Senate with recommendations regarding
ratification. The Senate can remedy compulsion disparity by declining to ratify
138. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 319.
139. Id. at 318. Some nations will respond to informal requests such as those made through
Interpol to obtain evidence. Others require the more formal letters rogatory. Id. at 318-9. For
example, in an effort to obtain fmancial records from banks in the Cayman Islands, a country with
strong bank secrecy laws, prosecutors convinced the federal courts to issue letters rogatory to
C a y m courts. However, the Cayman courts refused to respond with the requested evidence.
Prosecutors then resorted to unilateral measures, serving subpoenas duces tecum to the Miami
branch of the Canadian Bank of Nova Scotia seeking records maintained in the banks' Bahamian,
Cayman Islands, and Antigua branches. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384
(1lth Cir. 1982) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d
817 (11th Cir. 1984).When the bank refused to comply on the basis that compliance would violate
its country's bank secrecy laws, the federal court agreed to levy daily fines of $25,000 on the bank.
This was the first time the courts became involved in the process of helping the government obtain
supra note 10, at 358. Even with the existence
foreign evidence by ordering sanctions. NADELMANN,
of letters rogatoM the United States still resorted to unilateral actions such as bribing local officials.
Id. at 357.
140. Id. "[Tlhe principle incentive for many foreign governments to negotiate MLATs with the
United States was, and remains, the desire to curtail the resort by U.S. prosecutors, police agents,
and courts to unilateral, extraterritorialmeans of collecting evidence from abroad." Id. at 3 15.
141. The informal and formal processes that exist suffer from uncertainty as a result of systemic
obstacles such as foreign legal institutions, political tensions and the lack of compulsory mechanisms
for ensuring the provision of foreign evidence. MLATs are negotiated to overcome these problems.
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MLATs that create it.
The major advantage of the political process is its responsiveness to public
will and its ability to gather facts through hearings.142 The competence of the
Senate to protect parity depends upon the opportunity and ability of various
interests to effectively have their voices and views considered by Senators. Two
forms of political malfbnction, minoritarian bias and majoritarian bias, can
distort the political process. Determining what form of bias is likely to exist is
crucial because that bias will affect the competence of the Senate to protect the
norm of compulsion parity. Below, the Senate's MLAT ratification history is
examined, and the majoritarian bias which prevented parity interests from being
seriously considered by Senators is exposed.

I.

RatiJicationHistory

Prior to 1988, Senate ratification of MLATs occurred perfunctorily, with
little fanfare or opposition.143 However, that changed in 1988 when the
executive presented the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with additional
MLATs to consider and ratify.144 For the first time, these MLATs contained
provisions preventing defendants from utilizing the compulsory process
provisions.145 As a result, executive officials faced serious opposition to
ratification. The opposition groups included the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar
~ s s o c i a t i o nthe
, ~ ~American
~
Civil Liberties Union and private criminal defense

ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 68.
142. IMPERFECT
143. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 379.
144. Id.; Bruce Zagaris and Jessica Resnick, The Mexico-U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance in

Criminal Matters Treaty: Another Step Toward the Harmonization of International Law
Enforcement, 14 ARE. J. INT'L & COMP.L. 1, 20 (1997). The Senate was considering the treaties
with the Cayman Islands, Mexico, Canada, Belgium, Thailand and the Bahamas. Cayman Islands,
supra note 1, at 5.
145. The MLATs with the Cayman Islands, Mexico, Canada, and Belgium provide they do "not
give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain . any evidence!' The Bahamian and
Thailand treaties provide that the treaties are intended "solely" for mutual assistance between the
government and law enforcement authorities of the contracting parties and are "not intended or
designed to provide such assistance to private parties!' See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, U.S.-Bahamas, art. 1(3),S. TREATY
DOC.100-17 (1987).
A few years later, in 1996, the executive faced similar opposition to the Austrian MLAT. In my
discussions of the legislative history concerning the opposition to this language, no distinction is
made between testimony offered during the hearings in 1988-89 and that in 1996. Although there
also was opposition to several other provisions of the treaties, the focus is on the opposition to the
treaties' language baning defense access to the compulsory process provisions. For an extended
discussion of the complicated legislative history surrounding these treaties and the objections to
other provisions of the treaty, see generally Zagaris and Resnick, supra note 146.
146. The American Bar Association testified in support of defense access and the Criminal
Justice Section of the ABA issued a resolution, approved unanimously by the ABA's House of
Delegates, that "every future MLAT should expressly permit criminal defendants to use the treaty to
obtain evidence from the Requested country to use in their defense if they can make a showing of

..
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lawyers (collectively, the "defense lobby").147 The defense lobby argued the
treaties should not be ratified because they created an unconstitutional
compulsion disparity.148Executive officials dismissed this criticism149and their
arguments were persuasive. The Committee vote was nearly unanimous in favor
of recommending ratification of these MLATS.~~'
Only one Senator, the late
Jesse Helms, criticized MLATs, in part because of the inequity in evidence
gathering capabilities they created.151 He questioned why criminal defendants'
only option for obtaining foreign evidence would be the inefficient and
discretionary letters rogatory152process when "MLATs [were] the result of the
United States deciding that the letters rogatory were not satisfactory for U.S.
prosecutorial needs because they were too slow in obtaining information.7y153
necessity to the trial court." ABA Criminal Justice Section Report No. 109 (1989) cited in Michael
Abbell, DOJRenavs Assault on Defendant $ Right to Use Treaties to Obtain Evidence from Abroad,
THE CHAMPION,
AUG.21,1997, at 20,21.
147. Abbell, supra note 148, at 21. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 380.
148. The primary opposition came from testimony by Michael Abbell, the first director of OIA
who is now a defense lawyer. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 380. He argued the exclusionsuy
language violated fairness norms and the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment. He
pointed out that defendants would be forced to rely upon the inadequate letters rogatory process
while the prosecution could take advantage of MLATs.
149. Justice Department officials were not happy with their former colleague's criticisms. Id. at
380-81.
150. The vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was 17-2 in favor of the MLATs.
NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 383. Senator Helms represented one of the nay votes. The treaties
were not ratified by the full Senate until late 1989. Id. at 383. By that time, Senator Helms had
successfully appended two reservations to the treaty, one of which stated that nothing in the MLAT
would require or authorize "legislation or other action by the United States prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution as interpreted by the United States." Id. at 381-83. Neither reservation directly
addressed the compulsion disparity concern.
151. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 6, 52-55. Helms raised concerns about the disparity.
Id. at 175; Marian Nash, ContemporaryPractice of the United States Relating to International Law,
91 AM.J. INT'L. L. 93, 100 (Januwy, 1997) (setting forth the written questions submitted by Senator
Helms to the Department of State in connection with hearings over the advice and consent of a
number of MLATs in 1996). His written questions included the following:
Defendants do not have access to information through MLAT procedures. This
disparity between prosecution and defendant in access to MLAT procedures has led
some to question the fairness and even the constitutionality of MLATs denying
individual rights. At the core of the legal objections is the belief that it is improper in
our adversarial system of justice to deny defendants compulsory process and other
effective procedures from compelling evidence abroad if those procedures are
available to the prosecution . . . .Are there any efforts to provide access to information
under consideration in current negotiations?
152. Letters rogatory are a completely discretionary and diplomatic process for obtaining
foreign evidence. See supra notes 134-143 and accompanying text for a description of the failings of
the letters rogatory procedure.
153. See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 175. In relevant part, Senator Helms' question was as
follows:
I believe that the Justice Department says that individuals can use letters rogatory, . . .
but the MLATs are the result of the United States deciding that the letters rogatory
were not satisfactory for U.S. prosecutorial needs because they were too slow in
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The Committee's report to the Senate recommending ratification did
acknowledge that the "disparity between prosecution and defendant . . . has led
some to question the fairness and event [sic] the constitutionality of MLATs
denying individual rights."154 However, the report concluded, "it is clear that
MLATs are intended to aid law enforcement authorities only."155 The
Committee's decision to ratifjr the MLATs, despite its awareness of the
compulsion disparity they created, is evidence of political malfunction in the
form of majoritarian bias. A discussion of political malfunction and how it
affected the Senate ratification process follows.
2.

Evidence of Majoritarian Bias

Political malfunction can take the form of minoritarian or majoritarian bias,
depending upon how the impacts of a policy are distributed amongst those
affected.156 Minoritarian bias occurs when a special interest minority group
prevails on an issue that disproportionately harms the majority. The majority
could change the policy by virtue of its numbers, but each individual member of
the majority is only minimally affected, for example, the per capita impact of the
policy is small. There is little incentive for individuals to expend time and
energy to understand the issues or even to recognize the harm to their
interests.157 On the other hand, the per capita impact on individual members of
the special interest minority group is large. Each member thus has the incentive
to understand its interests, organize political activity and determine the most
effective way to influence the political process in order to prevail.158 Hence,
minoritarian bias is most likely to occur when an interest group with small
numbers and high per capita stakes is pitted against a majority with low per
capita stakes.159
Majoritarian bias also results from a skewed distribution of impacts.160 But
this time, the majority understands its interests and votes to implement a policy
that harms the minority group far more than any corresponding benefit to the
majority. Although the minority group may understand the disproportionate
harm to its interests, it simply cannot overcome the power of the majority to
obtaining information . . . . My question is, Why should American citizens accused of
a crime by foreign governments be stuck with a process that the Justice Department
itself has called "cumbersome and ineffective?"
154. Austria, supra note 87, at 10. In an earlier MLAT, the committee additionally stated that,
"[Nlothing in the treaty is intended to negate the authority of the Court to ask the prosecution to
make requests for information under the treaty." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 5.
155. Austria, supra note 87, at 9, 10 ("MLATs were intended to be law enforcement tools, and
were never intended to provide benefits to the defense bar.").
156. IWERFECTALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 68.
157. Id. at 68-69.
158. Id. at 68-72.
159. Id. at 71-72.
160. A Jobfor Judges, supra note 40, at 672.
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outvote them. I6l
The Committee's overwhelming vote in support of ratification, despite
awareness of the compulsion disparity, evidences the majoritarian bias that
existed during the ratification process. Both the executive and defense lobbies
were well-informed as to the issues surrounding M L A T S I ~ ~ and the channels of
political influence, and both had high per capita stakes. However, the executive
lobby successfully influenced the Senate hearings because they could credibly
threaten to harness the power of the voting majority. In such a situation, when a
smaller group within the majority has high stakes in an issue and can impel other
majority members to act, they are known as a catalytic subgroup.163
A catalytic subgroup operates much like a special interest minority but is
distinguished by its ability to spur the majority into action.lMIn order to do this,
the subgroup must accomplish three things. First, it must educate the majority to
care enough about a policy to take steps to implement it. Second, since the
policy will disproportionately impact a minority group, the subgroup must
convince majority members that they will not be mistaken for or become a part
of that minority. Third, the subgroup must attain these goals in a manner that is
easy for the majority to understand and digest with minimal effort. Otherwise,
because of the low per capita stakes of each majority group member, they will
simply not expend energy to learn enough about a particular policy to care
enough to vote.165
The subgroup can attain these goals through the use of simple symbols and
safe targets. Stereotypes are examples of simple symbols. These symbols convey
considerable information with minimal effort. They are familiar and traditional
sources of differentiation which people are usually "exposed to at an early
age."166 As such, they are endowed with meaning that is immediately
recognized, often creating a visceral, emotional response.167 A swastika is a
particularly cogent example of a simple symbol that can be used with ease to
communicate a powerful message to a targeted constituency.
A safe target is a discrete and easily identifiable group, such as one defined
by its race or e t h n i ~ i t y that
, ~ ~ will
~ be disproportionately harmed by a policy.
161. Id.
162. A technical analysis of the treaties is provided to the Senate by the treaty negotiators to
address anticipated problems and questions. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 354. The executive was
criticized for failing to make the treaties and their accompanying technical analyses available to the
public until the eve of the Senate hearings. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 205, 206 (1988)
(statement of Bruce Zagaris).
163. IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 72.
164. Id. Unlike a special interest group, however, the subgroup has the incentive to inform and
organize the lower per capita stake members of the majority. Id.
165. See supra notes 158-161discussing minoritarian bias.
166. A Job for Judges,supra note 40, at 676.
167. Id. at 676-77.
168. Id. at 677.
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The target is "safe" only if the majority feels secure that it will not become part
of or be mistaken for that minority. The more familiar the classification or
source of difference between the safe target and the members of the majority,
the easier it is to activate the majority to vote.169
By coupling a simple symbol with a safe target, the catalytic subgroup can
efficiently and effectively educate the majority about an issue. Use of these
symbols and targets lowers the information costs of educating the low stakes
majority and spurring them to action.170 When a catalytic subgroup can utilize
simple symbols in conjunction with a safe target, instances of severe
majoritarian bias are most likely to exist.
Any advantage the political process has by virtue of its ability to respond to
the public will and gather facts, becomes a liability in the face of majoritarian
political malfunction. Catalytic subgroups can influence the political process
merely by threatening to activate the majority and turn out the vote. By using
simple symbols against a safe target, the subgroup can issue a subtle threat to
legislators: side with us or we will activate the majority and vote you out of
office. If credible, such threats are a powerful bargaining chip when negotiating
with political actors,171 and can influence policy-making. Thus, legislators'
responsiveness to the public will may exacerbate majoritarian bias.
The executive lobby's use of simple symbols against a safe target can
explain its success before the Senate. Criminal defendants are a safe target
because they are a discrete, easily identifiable and marginalized group. During
the Senate hearings, the executive lobby emphasized the message that support
This theme was
for MLATs meant politicians were being "tough on crime.77172
echoed numerous times in the testimony of executive branch 0fficia1s.l~~
169. Id. at 676.
170. Id.; IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13, at 73.

172. The testimony of Mary Mochary, Principle Deputy Legal Adviser with the Department of
State provides a good example of the executive's use of simple symbols against safe targets:
We have stressed that mutual legal assistance treaties can help countries fight back
against the enemies within: Narcotraffickers who threaten the stability of wellmeaning governments; terrorists who hold the rule of law in contempt; and whitecollar criminals who enrich themselves by stealing from honest citizens. We have also
emphasized that the treaties are important because many criminals operate on an
international scale, orchestrating illegal activities in the United States from foreign
countries . . . Today's major criminal. . . whether he embezzles money or launders it,
is far more likely than not to cross an international border or to leave traces of his
criminal conduct in several countries. This kind of conduct is not limited to the drug
trafficker or terrorist, even though they may be most proficient in these practices. This
is the methodology of the major criminal who seeks to exploit to his advantage the
barriers to cooperation that can be erected by international borders.
See Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 58-59,225-26.
173. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 87,90,92 (testimony of Mary Mochary) ("There is little
doubt that The Bahamas will remain a significant transshipment point for narcotics for the
foreseeable future. This fact only underscores the need for more eff~cientand effective cooperation

.
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Politicians understand that being "tough on crime" decreases the potential for
ouster.l 74
The defense lobby, on the other hand, was at a disadvantage. They could
not credibly threaten activation of the majority. While they could bring
politicians' attention to the risk of convicting the innocent in the absence of
compulsion parity, legislators are aware that most citizens believe that those
accused of crime have too many rights. In this context, constitutional protections
for criminal defendants are viewed as "technicalities" that allow the factually
guilty to go free.175
Majoritarian bias infected the political process. While it is impossible to
assert that this bias was the singular causal factor resulting in the ratification of
MLATs that disproportionately harm those accused of crime, it certainly was a
significant contributing factor. Unearthing the majoritarian bias that permeated
the Senate has implications for institutional choice. Majoritarian bias thrives in a
majoritarian system, making it difficult for the political process to correct the
policy results it produces as a consequence of the ma1fun~tion.l~~
Whether the
Senate is competent to protect compulsion parity depends upon the defense
lobby's ability to counteract the powerful influence of the executive lobby's
credible threat to activate the majority against Senators who do not vote to give

in joint law enforcement endeavors;" "[Tlhe treaty with the Cayman Islands will facilitate U.S.
efforts to obtain bank records and other evidence of money laundering and trafficking in illicit
narcotics;" "[Tlhe treaty should help shore up U.S. efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics from
Southeast Asia to the rest of the world."); Id. at 94 (statement of Mark M. Richard presenting the
views of the Department of Justice) ("The negotiation and implementation of effective mutual legal
assistance treaties and executive agreements is a very important aspect of our effort to investigate
and prosecute serious crime. As this Committee knows all too well, we have in recent years seen the
internationalization of serious crimes such as narcotics trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, and
large scale fraud. As a result, it has become increasingly common that significant evidence in major
criminal cases will be found abroad. Obtaining such evidence, particularly in a form that will be
admissible in our courts, has not been an easy matter. The purpose of our MLATs is to provide a
reliable and efficient means of obtaining this evidence."); Id. at 217 (letter to committee from J.
Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs) ("Secretary of State Shultz asked me to
convey to you the importance which he attaches to Senate approval of all six treaties during the
current session. The treaties are very important to U.S. law enforcement interests, especially in
obtaining convictions against international narcotics traffickers, terrorists, and other international
criminals").
174. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 509 ("Voters demand harsh treatment of criminals; politicians respond with tougher
sentences...and more criminal prohibitions. This dynamic has been particularly powerful the past two
decades, as both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war to see who can appropriate
the label 'tough on crime."').
175. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Comment: Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofAppIying
Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV.L. REV. 152, 170-17 1 (199 1) (referencing the
public's view that too many guilty defendants go free based upon "technicalities."); Guido Calabresi,
Lms and Truth: Debate: Exclusionary Rules: The Exclusionay Rule, 26 HARV.J.L. & PUB.POL'Y
11 1, 111 (2003) (conservatives view the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule as a "technicality"
that frees guilty criminal defendants).

176. A Jobfor Judges, supra note 40, at 705.
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advice and consent to MLATs. This may prove difficult when politicians believe
that being "soft on crime" will hurt their chances of re-e1ecti0n.l~~.

C. The Executive
The executive branch also plays a role in protecting compulsion parity
because it is responsible for negotiating MLATs. This institution occupies a
unique position in our adversarial criminal justice system. On the one hand, it
must be concerned with effectively prosecuting the guilty. On the other, its
agents, the prosecutors, must'act as "ministers of justice"178 to ensure that
defendants receive a fair t1-ia1.l~~Bias can exist in this institution when the

177. Politicians are loath to be characterized as "soft on crime." See, e.g., Jill Young Miller,
Hanging Tough; She's Survived Polio, Poverty and Two Bouts of Bone Cancer. Georgia Supreme
Court Justice Carol Hunstein Is Used to Fighting. She Says She'll Never Be the Same after a
Bruising Battle for Re-election, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Dec. 17, 2006, at ID; Jennifer
Steinhauer, Bulging, Troubled Prisons Push Calijoinia Oflcials to Seek a New Approach, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11,2006, at A18. A change in attitude may occur if the defense lobby can demonstrate
that a factually innocent person was wrongfully convicted as a result of the absence of compulsion
parity. See generally JIMDWYERET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION
& OTHER
DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLYCONVICTED
(1st ed. 2000) for a discussion of how wrongful
convictions can affect legislative reform and public opinion.
178. MODELRULESOF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1995) ("A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); See also ABA
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.3, cmt. (3d ed.
1993) (the prosecutor must "strive not for 'courtroom victories'. ..but for results that best serve the
overall interests of justice."); MODELCODEOF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek
justice, not merely to convict."); Lisa Kurcias, Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence,
69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1205, I209 (2000) ("The prosecutor has this duty to seek justice because she
is a representative, not of a single individual, but of the government and society as a whole.");
Richard Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations:A Paper Tiger, 65
N.C. L. REV. 693,695 (1987) ("The prosecutor's role as an advocate is tempered by an obligation of
fairness, a duty to ensure that each trial results in an accurate determination of guilt and
punishment."); Jennifer Blair, The Regulation of Federal Prosecutorial Misconduct by State Bar
Associations: 28 U.S.C. 530B and the Reality of Inaction, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 625, 629 (2001)
("federal prosecutors have shouldered the heightened obligation to always 'seek justice,' and not to
merely be an advocate for a client.").
179. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (The prosecutor, as
the agent of the people and the State, has the unique duty to ensure fundamentally fair trials by
seeking not only to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and to administer justice.). See also Moore
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 809-810 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It
is the State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that the trial is fair."). As stated by the
Supreme Court over 70 years ago:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of
a sovereigntywhose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
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appropriate balance between these conflicting roles is upset. The existence of
bias affects the executive's competence to protect the norm of equal access to
foreign evidence. Scrutinizing the role this institution played in negotiating
MLATs uncovers the extent of any bias that existed. The two subparts below
analyze the negotiation history of the first MLAT, and the executive's role in
creating the current compulsion disparity.

1.

Negotiating the Swiss MLAT

The evolution of MLATs is primarily a chronicle of the executive branch's
efforts to facilitate foreign evidence-gathering and ensure its provision in a form
admissible in American courts.180The United States negotiated its first MLAT
with switzerland.181Examination of the negotiation process reveals its delicate
nature and the seemingly insurmountable hurdles executive officials overcame.
While each MLAT negotiation involves different considerations dependent upon
existing political relations with the country and the differing law enforcement
priorities of each,lS2 valuable lessons were learned during the Swiss
negotiations that facilitated the negotiation of subsequent treaties.183
The Swiss MLAT was the first negotiated between a civil law and a
common law country.184 Officials fiom the State, Justice and Treasury
Departments as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission were given
negotiating responsibility.185 The United States sought an MLAT with
Switzerland primarily because it had the toughest bank secrecy laws.186These
laws had stymied the efforts of prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to
obtain information fiom Swiss financial institutions.187 As a result, organized
crime, including the Mafia, successfully hid assets in ~witzer1and.l~~
wrongll conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See generally Bruce Green, Why Should
Prosecutors Seek Justice? 26 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 607,634 (1999).
180. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 327.
181. Id.at323.
182. Id. at 345-375 (discussing the different incentives for negotiating treaties with other

countries).
183. Id. at 345.
184. Id. at 326. Switzerland was

already a signatory to a multilateral MLAT, the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, European Treaty Series No. 30, and several
bi-lateral criminal assistance treaties with European countries. See Lionel Frei, Overcoming Bank
Secrecy: Assistance in Tar Matters in Switzerland on Behalf of Foreign Criminal Authorities, 9
N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L& COMP.
L. 107 (1988).
185. Id. at 324.
186. Id. at 324-25 (explaining other reasons for negotiating the treaty with Switzerland first.)
See also, Lionel Frei, Overcoming Bank Secrecy: Assistance in Tar Matters in Switzerland on Behalf
qfForeign Criminal Authorities, 9 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT'L& COMP.
L. 107, 112-22 (1988) (discussing
how foreign nations can obtain information despite Swiss bank secrecy laws).
187. Id. at 324-25.
188. Id. at 324-26.
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Negotiations were politically sensitive and took over nine years to
complete.18gThe Swiss press periodically criticized the negotiations, fanning
fears that treaty requests would be relatively one-sided, with most coming from
the United states.lgO Additionally, Swiss business leaders feared potential
investors would invest elsewhere if MLATs allowed the United States to pierce
bank secrecy laws.lgl Eventually, the negotiators held meetings with Swiss
business and banking leaders and obtained their support for the treaty.lg2 The
treaty was signed in 19731g3and ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Swiss in
1976.1g4
The negotiation of the Swiss treaty illuminates the challenges and
compromises involved in creating a mechanism for regularizing foreign
evidence gathering. Even after the treaty was signed, the transition was rocky.
For example, the United States angered the Swiss by continuing to utilize
unilateral measures, such as court orders,lg5to compel Swiss banks located in
the United States to provide evidence in violation of Swiss bank secrecy
laws.lg6 The countries negotiated and signed two Memorandums of
Understanding to resolve the tensions,lg7 and agreed every effort would be
made to utilize the MLAT before resorting to unilateral measures. By the end of
the 1980s, most of the kinks were resolved.lg8
The executive learned valuable lessons from the Swiss negotiations and
from using the treaty which helped it to anticipate problems and avoid pitfalls in
future negotiations.lg9 First, the executive learned to negotiate treaties more
189. Treaty negotiations began in 1967 and ended when the treaty was ratified in 1976.
supra note 10, at 326, 334. For fhrther discussion of the negotiating history of the
NADELMANN,
U.S. and Swiss MLAT, see Lionel Frei and Stefan Treschel, Origins and Applications of the United
States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 3 1 HARV.INT'L L.J. 77 (1990).
190. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 327
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 333.
194. See Swiss MLAT, supra note 93.
195. For example, the United States resorted to unilateral measures during discovery in the
supra note 10, at 338. Prosecutors obtained a
largest tax evasion case in U.S. history. NADELMANN,
subpoena duces tecum from a federal court which they served on the U.S. based subsidiary of a
Swiss company. When the Swiss company failed to comply, the court issued a fine of $50,000 per
day. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Mark Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d
Cir.1983);In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Marc Rich
& Co., A.G., 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984); 739 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1984).The case eventually settled.
196. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 335.
197. See id. at 336-39.
198. Id. at 339. A similar agreement was included in the MLAT with the Cayman Islands. Id. at
361. The U.S. agreed not to serve subpoenas duces tecum on U.S. branches of foreign banks as a
way of circumventing bank secrecy laws. See Art. 17 of Cayman MLAT, NADELMANN,
supra note
10,at 361,363-65.
199. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 341,343. In 1979, the State Department created the Office
of Law Enforcement and Intelligence (LEI). Id. at 342. The LEI and OIA began negotiating MLATs
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quickly, avoiding the laborious nine year process experienced with the
Second, it learned that having at least one foreign representative with experience
in criminal prosecutions could help streamline negotiations?01 That person
could explain the country's criminal processes and also build relationships with
executive officials in order to facilitate requests later made under the treaty?02
Third, the language of the treaties was simplified in order to broaden the types
of evidence available, reduce the likelihood that courts from either country
would impede legal assistance, and avoid future disagreements?03
2.

Creation of the CompulsionDisparity

The Swiss treaty is silent regarding defense access to its compulsory
process provisions.2w There is no evidence defense access was discussed or
even considered. This changed in future MLATs, the reason for which is
unclear. Perhaps the experience of prosecutors litigating a major fraud case
utilizing the Swiss MLAT accounts for the change. In January of 1980, Italian
financier Michele Sindona was charged with 69 counts, including fraud and
2~~
perjury, in connection with the collapse of the Franklin National ~ a n k . Prior
to trial, Sindona requested evidence pursuant to the MLAT with the Swiss. This
was the first time a defendant sought foreign evidence under the MLAT. The
prosecution refused to utilize the treaty on Sindona's behalf. However, because
the treaty was silent regarding a defendant's ability to use it to obtain evidence,
the federal district court ordered the Department of Justice to request the
evidence or the case would be dismissed with prejudice. 206
Prior to the Sindona prosecution, the possibility that defendants could take
advantage of MLATs may not have occurred to executive officials. Whether or
not the Sindona prosecution had any bearing on the change, it is certainly
interesting that after Sindona's trial in early 1980, every subsequent MLAT,
save one, included language restricting its use to the government.207There is no
together. Id. at 342. This partnership worked well, with the LEI bringing expertise in the politics of
judicial assistance and treaty negotiations and the OIA bringing expertise in prosecuting crime and in
making and responding to MLAT requests.Id.
200. See id. at 334,343.

201. Id.at343.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 346.
204. See, e.g., 27 U.S.T. 2019, Articles 9, 10,25.
205. United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980).For background on the prosecution
of Michele 'The Shark" Sindona, see James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties as a Way
to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 CASE W .RES.J. INT'L L., 405,415 (1988).
supra note 9, 312-4-8, at 174 n.7; Alan Ellis and Robert L.
206. See ABBELL Aim RISTAU,
Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
LAW: PROCEDURAL
AND ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
2d edition 403, 440 (M. Cherif
Bmiouni ed., 1999).
207. The treaty with the Netherlands is the exception. See Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
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need to speculate about the purpose for adding the restrictive language. A State
Department official stated, "MLATs were intended to be law enforcement tools,
and were never intended to provide benefits to the defense bar.''208 The
executive gives numerous explanations for creating the disparity: it has the job
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;209 granting access to defendants
~ ~ ~defendants do not
would deter other nations from negotiating M L A T S ; and
need compulsory process because they have greater access to foreign
evidence.211 The executive has even denied that MLATs create compulsory
process.212
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Neth., June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734.It does not contain the restrictive
language although it was signed after the Sindona trial. The Italian MLAT provides that the treaty is
intended "solely" for mutual assistance between the government or law enforcement authorities of
the contracting parties. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Together with a
Related Memorandum of Understanding, U.S.-Italy, art. 1,Nov. 9, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. 98-25. The
Thailand and Bahamian treaties provide that they are not intended or designed to provide assistance
to private parties. Treaty with Thailand on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Thai]., art.
1Mar. 19, 1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 101-18; Treaty with The Bahamas on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Bah., art. 1, Aug. 19, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-17. The Canadian,
Caymanian, and Mexican MLATs provide that they do "not give rise to a right on the part of a
private party to obtain . . . any evidence." See Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters, U.S.-Can., art. 2, Mar. 18, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-14 [hereinafter Canadian MLAT];
Cayman Islands, supra note 1; Mutual Legal Assistance Cooperation Treaty, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 9,
1987,S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-13.
208. Austria, supra note 88 at 10 (testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
during the ratification process). The State Department's website discussing MLATs provides that
defendants
must
generally
utilize
the
letters
rogatory
process.
See
www.travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/j.
See also Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at
176 (Testimony of White, former director of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice.) ("It was the conception in the very beginning that these kinds of law
enforcement tools would be limited to the parties, the governments, the law enforcement authorities
of each.").
209. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10 (The government "has the job of assembling evidence to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, so it must have the tools to do so. The defense does not have
the same job, and therefore does not need the same tools.") This statement reflects a deep
misunderstanding of the role of prosecutors in our adversarial system of criminal justice. This
misunderstanding is not surprising. As advocates, prosecutors are not immune from the pressure and
desire to win. In fact, the many prosecution offices foster a "win-loss scorekeeping mentality." For a
comprehensive discussion of this mentality and culture, see Catherine Fergnson-Gilbert, It is Not
Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-LossScore-Keeping Mentality
Doing JusticeforProsecufozs, 38 CAL,W .L. REV. 283 (2001) and Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
J. LEGAL ETHICS355 (discussing institutionalpressures on
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO.
prosecutors to win at all costs).
210. The government has never asserted that any treaty partner required the exclusion as a
condition to signing the treaty. In fact, an executive official admits that "there was no discussion of
how our treaty partners would react to receiving MLAT requests by or on behalf of criminal
defendants" among the negotiators. Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 274.
21 1. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10-11. ("[Tlhe defendant frequently has far greater access to
evidence abroad than does the Government, since it is the defendant who chose to utilize foreign
institutions in the first place.").
212. "[Tlhere is nothing that the defense is being denied" because none of the MLATs provide
the government with transnational compulsory process. See Austria, supra note 87, at 10-11. This

102

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 26:1

The creation of a compulsion disparity demonstrates the existence of
executive bias in favor of the executive's role as law enforcer rather than
minister of justice. The reason the executive does not protect a defendant's right
to compulsory process appears obvious. After all, allowing defendants access to
the treaty to obtain evidence would make successful prosecution of transnational
offenders more difficult. It is easy, then, to dismiss consideration of the
executive as an institution that could protect parity.
Further analysis, however, renders this ready dismissal inappropriate.
Executive officials did take pains to ensure that MLATs protected some defense
interests. The treaties provide protections for the privilege against selfincrimination.213 They also protect defendants' sixth amendment right to
confrontation by providing that the defendant (or his counsel) be present in
foreign judicial proceedings to take evidence.214Executive officials safeguarded
these defense interests even in the face of questions from foreign governments
about why these rights needed accommodation and amid complaints about the
inconveniences these rights would cause in foreign judicial proceedings.215
Certainly, protecting these interests does not make prosecution easier.
Additionally, in at least one instance, the executive has requested defense

statement contradicts testimony of other executive branch officials before the Senate. For example, a
Deputy Assistant Attorney General stated that:
[MLATs] provide, from our perspective, a much more effective means of obtaining
evidence. . . . [An] MLAT obligates each country to provide evidence and other forms
of assistance needed in criminal cases . . . .[I]n an MLAT, we have the opportunity to
include procedures that will permit us to obtain evidence in a form that will be
admissible in our courts....[O]ur MLATs are structured to streamline and make more
effective the process of obtaining evidence.
Id. at 2-3 (citing Worldwide Review of Status of U.S. Extradition Treaties and Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Befre the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Committee on
Foreign Aflairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 36-37 (1987) (statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division)).This same official testified in hearings that "[ilt has
been increasingly common that significant evidence in major criminal cases will be found abroad.
Obtaining such evidence, particularly in a form that will be admissible in our courts, has not been an
easy matter. The purpose of our MLAT's is to provide a reliable and efficient means of obtaining
this evidence." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of Mark M. Richard). The express
provisions of MLATs create compulsory process for the government. For example, the U.S.-Mexico
MLAT not only compels a witness to appear for a deposition, but also compels that the witness bring
any requested documents:
A person in the requested State whose testimony is requested shall be comvelled by
subpoena, if necessary, by the competent authority of the requested Party to appear
and testify or produce documents, records, and objects in the requested State to the
same extent as in criminal investigations or proceedings in that State.
Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for Mutual Legal Assistance, U.S.-Mex., Art. 7,27 I.L.M. 443,449 (emphasis added). Similar
language exists in other MLATs.
213. See 27 U.S.T. 2019, Article 13;NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 332.
214. See 27 U.S.T. 2019, Article 12;NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 332-33.
215. NADELMANN,
supra note 10, at 355.
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evidence under an MLAT despite the existence of the exclusionary language.216
The executive's protection of these interests is significant for two reasons.
First, it demonstrates the executive's willingness and ability to protect
defendants' constitutional rights in certain circumstances. Second, it shows that
foreign nations are amenable to persuasion fi-om the executive to include
provisions in MLATs that are alien to their legal systems and procedures. Thus,
the executive institution cannot easily be dismissed as an option for achieving
the goal of parity, for it is best situated to convince foreign nations of the
importance of parity and, at times, it protects defense interests.
The executive's competence to protect parity norms depends upon whether,
in most instances, the bias tips in favor of their role as ministers of justice or as
advocates seeking to effectively prosecute transnational offenders. The question
is whether the executive can be relied upon to strike the appropriate balance in
every case. Experience in analogous contexts demonstrates the answer is likely
no?17 While the executive may decide to protect parity by utilizing an MLAT
216. In United States v. Des Mavteau, 162 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Fla. 1995), once the court granted
the defendant's motion to depose a foreign national located in Canada, the prosecution agreed to
utilize the Canadian MLAT to facilitate it. Id. at 372 n.5 ("The United States, after communicating
with its office of International Affairs, informed the Court it is appropriate to utilize the treaty (with
Canada) in this manner.") The prosecutor utilized the Canadian MLAT despite language which
provides that it "shall not give rise to a right on the part of a private party to obtain . . . any evidence
... ." See Canadian MLAT, supra note 209, at art. 2.
217. For example, prosecutors could not be relied upon to disclose material exculpatory
evidence to defendants of their own volition, see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), or to
disclose witness perjury,see, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1972).
In the past, the executive has expressed the view that it might seek evidence on behalf of defendants
if there was a court order. According to an executive official: "Nothing in the proposed treaties
would preclude the Department of Justice from making MLAT requests on behalf of prosecutors
who wish to pursue claims raised by the defense . . . .[I]t would not be accurate to describe this
process as 'making a request on behalf of a criminal defendant." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at
273 (emphasis in original). However, their position seems to be hardening. In its most recent
statements on the issue, the Department of Justice has taken the position that it need not comply with
a court order to request information on behalf of the defense using an existing MLAT. See 3
MICHAELABBELL& BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,CRIMINAL,
OBTAINING
EVIDENCE,
at 27 & n.12 (Supp. 1997) ("The Department of Justice, however, has
continued to maintain that the restrictive language in the more recent mutual assistance treaties in
criminal matters gives it veto power over whether the United States will make a court-ordered treaty
request on behalf of a defendant."). In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1992, the Deputy Legal Adviser for the Department of State, Mr. Alan Kreczko, testified that "the
court . . . lack[s] the power or authority to compel the Government to make a request for the benefit
RELATIONS,
of the defense over the objection of the prosecution." STAFFOF S. COMM.ON FOREIGN
107.N~CONG.,CONSULAR
CONVENTIONS,
EXTRADITION
TREATIES,
AND TREATIES
RELATING
TO
MWLJALLEGAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMlNAL MATTERS6, 40-41 (Comm. Print 19921992). If the
prosecutor did not believe that the request was appropriate, and opposed the use of the MLAT for the
request, Mr. Kreczko testified that it was unlikely that the Department of Justice would make the
request. Id. In such cases, he stated, the Court would have to pursue the letters rogatory approach. Id.
He also testified that if the prosecutor felt the request was inappropriate, it could be ignored. See id.
Empirical analysis is necessary to determine whether or not the prosecution is actually requesting
evidence on behalf of defendants under the treaties. Arguably, the prosecution's role as a Minister of
Justice would require them to seek material and relevant evidence on a defendant's behalf.
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for the benefit of defendants, it is risky to rely upon the executive's good graces
to do so?18 Officials from the Department of Justice already express the view
that even if a court orders them to request defense evidence under the treaty,
they will refuse the order if they deem it to be inappropriate.219 Before
completely dismissing the executive, however, its competence to resolve the
disparity in access to process must be compared to that of the political process
and the courts. An examination of the competence of the courts to protect parity
follows.

D. The Courts
Criminal process questions are likely to be resolved by the courts because
in most instances, the questions arise in the context of a pending criminal
adjudication. Whether the court should provide a right and what the strength of
that right should be are questions of institutional choice. While this Article seeks
to answer these questions in the context of the compulsion disparity created by
MLATs, similar questions arise when seeking to resolve most criminal process
questions.
The character of the right to compulsion parity defined by courts will
reflect a choice amongst the relevant institution^?^^ The three Subparts below

218. Relying upon the good graces of the executive to protect compulsion parity is risky
because they are advocates, aRer all. In hotly contested cases, for example, it is more likely that the
prosecution will determine that the defense request is without merit. Prosecutors, just like defense
lawyers, are not immune from the pressures of trial and the desire to win that comes long with it.
Prosecutors have been known to hide physical evidence and bury statements inconsistent with their
theory of guilt. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You
Play the Game: Is the Win-LossScore-Keeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors, 38 CAL.W .
L. REV. 283, 297-99 (2001). She describes a situation where the prosecution failed to disclose a
statement from an eyewitness (the victim's brother) saying that the killers were white while the
prosecution was prosecuting a black man for the crime. If some prosecutors will go this far in their
zeal to win, there can be no question that some prosecutors will decide not to use the MLAT on
behalf of a defendant in order to place themselves at an advantage during the trial. It is in hotly
contested cases, when the defense's ability to rebut the prosecution's case with its own evidence
could make the difference between conviction and acquittal, that the prosecution will most likely
refuse to utilize the MLAT voluntarily on behalf of the defense.
219. While the government may decide to use the MLAT for the benefit of defendants, nothing
currently compels them to do so. An official from the Department of Justice expressed a similar
view:
There may be cases in which a court determines that because of the exceptional
circumstances of the case, the interests of justice require that it order the prosecutor to
make an MLAT request. In such a circumstance, the government would evaluate such
a prospective order, reserving its rights to oppose issuance or appeal issuance, and if it
lost such an appeal, to weigh the consequences of non-compliance. These
consequences could include dismissal of the case against the defendant, or suffering
such sanctions as the court might see fit to impose, including a prohibition on the
government's use of certain evidence in the case in question.
Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 273.
220. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanyingtext.
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respectively examine the considerations for deciding whether courts should
define no rights, moderate rights or strong rights to compulsion parity in
transnational criminal cases. The strength of the right reflects an institutional
choice, and thus, a conception of the relative competence of the available
decision-makersF21

I.

No Rights to Compulsion Parity

The courts can determine that no Sixth Amendment right to compulsion
parity exists in the transnational context. This judicial inaction would leave
MLATs in place and represent a decision that the political process and the
executive are the appropriate forums for change. Before the decision to provide
no remedy or judicial review is made, the form and degree of bias in the political
and executive institutions must be examined and compared.222 Otherwise this
judicial response can exacerbate existing biases or produce counter-intuitive
results.
When considering the relative merits of the political process and the
executive, there are two factors to weigh. The first is the majoritarian bias that
permeates the political process?23 The second is the executive bias in favor of
its law enforcer role.224The court should produce no rights or remedies only if
the executive or political institutions, even in the face of their existing biases,
are comparably better suited than the courts to achieve the goal of equitable
process.
A determination of no rights would seem to exacerbate, rather than
alleviate existing biases in the executive and political institutions. It is easy,
then, to assume that these institutions should not be relied upon to protect parity.
But comparative institutional analysis rejects such a simplistic approach. The
existence of a malfunction in other institutions does not, in and of itself, create a
sufficient basis for the allocation of institutional responsibility to the courts. As
explored in Subpart two, the courts may perform no better because of limited
physical resources and personnel and lack of competence to decide the issue at
hand?25
2.

Moderate Rights to CompuIsion Parity

Rather than declaring no rights to compulsion parity, courts could define
moderate compulsory process rights for transnational defendants by creating a
flexible doctrinal standard. This approach indicates a determination by the

221. LAW'SLIMITS,
supra note 12,at 71.
222. Id.
223. Seesupra notes 158-178 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanyingtext.
225. IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES,
supra note 13,at 138-149.
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courts that they are the institution best suited to protect the norm of parity in
evidence-gathering. A moderate right requires courts to substitute their decisionmaking for that of other in~titutions.2~~
Rather than leaving it to the executive ta
decide if it will respond to a defense request for evidence, or letting the Senate
decide whether or not to ratify an MLAT, the court decides when and under
what circumstances compulsion parity is warranted.
A standard requires courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether a
defendant's rights to compulsion parity are violated. This increases the strain on
courts' limited physical and personnel resources. Therefore, before deciding to
substitute their decisions for those of other institutions by defining a moderate
right, courts must decide whether the balance of competence and scale favors
Competence refers to the judges' ability to investigate,
that sub~titution.2~~
understand, and make substantive d e c i s i a n ~ It
. ~is~ ~determined, for the most
. 2 ~strain
~ on the court's limited resources is
part, by training and e ~ ~ e r i e n c eThe
reduced when its competence in an issue is high.230
Federal judges have special competence in criminal procedure issues as a
result of experience. The federal criminal docket constitutes a significant portion
of the cases federal courts adjudicate each year. Judges frequently interpret the
constitutional provisions governing a defendant's rights and a prosecutor's
obligations in such cases. Despite the strain on the court's limited resources,
balancing the issues in order to determine how to protect compulsion parity in
transnational criminal cases is well within the competence of the courts.
However, transnational cases in general and MLATs in particular raise
potential foreign policy issues, a traditional area of doubt about the courts'
corn~etence.2~~
Conducting foreign affairs usually requires secrecy, flexibility
Courts do not
and the ability to respond quickly to changed cir~umstances?~~
have independent access to foreign intelligence and thus may not understand the
far-reaching implications of their decisions. Judges must consider the possibility
that their rulings on issues involving foreign affairs unwittingly expose sensitive
information and reduce the executive's flexibility to respond?33
226.
227.

See id. at 150.
Id. Scale refers to "the resources and budget available to the judiciary and the constraints
on the expansion and size of the adjudicative process." Id. at 138.
228. Id. at 138-39.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 138-150.
231. Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for
Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 380-394 (1984) [hereinafter Taking Institutions
Seriously]. The executive has speculated that including a provision that allowed defense access to
the treaty might prevent some nations from entering into MLATs. Austria, supra note 87, at 10.
232. Taking Institutions Seriously, supra note 233, at 381.
233. Id. at 382. The Supreme Court is reluctant to adjudicate issues that it views as implicating
foreign policy or foreign relations. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 697 (1998)
("Because foreign relations are specifically committed by the Constitution to the political branches,
U.S.Const., art. 11, 8 2, cl. 2, we would not make a discretionary judgment premised on inducing
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A flexible balancing approach may best serve the goal of achieving
compulsion parity while reducing foreign policy concerns. How would such a
standard work? In cases where defendants require foreign evidence, the court
would first determine whether the requested evidence is relevant and material.
This requirement of materiality is consistent with current doctrinal approaches in
domestic criminal cases. If the requested evidence is material, the court could
then order the prosecution to request the evidence under the existing MLAT or
risk
This is a viable option. The treaties require that requests for evidence come
from the government and not a private party. However, they are silent regarding
the ability of the government to request evidence on behalfof a defendant. One
executive official expressed the view that if a request was made by the
government on behalf of a defendant, "the United States would expect the
foreign government to treat the request like any other MLAT request made by
the United
This flexible case by case approach requires courts to do
more, but avoids invalidating MLATs, thereby avoiding serious foreign policy
concerns.
3.

Strong Rights to Compulsion Parity

An alternative approach for the courts is to find a strong Sixth Amendment
right to compulsion parity in transnational criminal cases. The strongest Sixth
Amendment right would require courts to substitute their decisions for political
process and executive determinations. By creating a clear doctrinal rule that
compulsion parity is a constitutional requirement in transnational cases and
MLATs are unconstitutional because of the disparity they create, the courts
reject Senate and executive determinationsthat the disparity is appropriate.
The advantage of a clear rule is that it requires minimal judicial activity. If
MLATs are unconstitutional because of the disparity they create, the decision of
how to remedy the disparity falls to other institutions. In the meantime, in the
absence of MLATs, defendants and prosecutors would be forced to rely upon
the evidence-gathering market to obtain foreign evidence. By finding a strong
right to compulsory process, the courts choose the market as the institution to
protect parity, at least until new MLATs are negotiated. Though the pre-MLAT
them to adopt policies in relation to other nations without squarely confronting the propriety of
groundingjudicial action on such a premise").
234. There is precedent for this. In United States v, Des Marteau, 162 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Fla.
1995), once the court granted the defendants motion to depose a foreign national located in Canada,
the prosecution agreed to utilize the MLAT with Canada to facilitate it. Id. at 372 n.5 ("The United
States, after communicating with its office of International Affairs, informed the Court it is
appropriate to utilize the treaty [with Canada] in this manner.") Similarly, in United States v.
Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), the court required prosecutors to obtain defense evidence
utiiizing the existing MLAT. See 3 MICHAEL &BELL & BRUNO A. RISTAU,
INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCECRIMINAL
27 & n. 12. (Supp. 1997).
235. Cayman Islands, supra note I, at 274.
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market was far from perfect, it represents a viable institutional choice for
attaining equal access to foreign evidence between prosecutors and defendants.
Creation of a strong right might motivate the executive to protect parity
explicitly in the treaties. Rather than relying upon the inefficient evidencegathering market, the executive can decide to negotiate parity-protecting
language into future treaties, as well as save existing treaties by negotiating
memorandums of understanding that explicitly require prosecutors to request
foreign evidence on behalf of defendants. The new treaties and the
memorandums of understanding for existing MLATs could contain a materiality
requirement in order to allay a foreign nation's concern that it will be inundated
with frivolous or baseless requests for defense evidence.
Negotiation of memorandums of understanding can likely be done with
minimal delay as a result of the special relationships developed between the
~
for the OIL%
nations during the process of negotiating M L A T S ? ~Attorneys
already schedule annual or biannual meetings with foreign Central Authorities to
discuss issues and problems.237 If the executive decides to negotiate
memorandums of understanding, the issue could simply be added to the agenda.
If the nation is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
~ i ~ h(often
t s described
~ ~ ~ as the International Bill of Rights), it will likely sign
such a memorandum since the Covenant contains explicit protection of the right
to compulsion parity.239
Similarly, a court-declared right provides the defense lobby with a

236. "[Tlhe ratification of an MLAT reflects the fact that the two countries consider each other
important and that their mutual legal assistance relationship is something that they are proud of' as a
national asset. Hams Lecture, supra note 90. Harris also acknowledges that during the negotiation
process, personal relationships and contacts were developed that facilitate cooperation. The Director
of the OIA stated, "A related advantage [of MLATS] is that it is far easier to amend or revise a
bilateral treaty than a comprehensive multilateral treaty. For instance, the U.S. is in the process now
of negotiating revisions and amendments to some of our older MLATs, on such topics as video link
or asset forfeiture and asset sharing. This enables states to add new ideas to the text of the bilateral
MLAT with a minimum of delay, or respond quickly to changes in legislation. Obviously, it is not
possible to revise multilateral crime conventions without a great deal of difficulty." id.
237. Thomas Snow, Symposium: Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: The Investigation and
Prosecution of White Collar Crime: International Challenges and Legal Tools Available to Address
Them, 11 W M &MARY
.
BILLOF RTS. J. 209, n.68 (2002).
238. I\lt. 14(3)(e), entered infoforce March 23, 1976,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
239. At least one treaty, the U.S.-Austria MLAT, specificallyprovides that the Austrian Central
Authority will make requests from the U.S. on behalf of their defendants under the treaty. See
Austria, supra note 87, at 14 (1996). In the technical analysis of this lxeaty, this provision was
explained as follows: "The Austrian delegation indicated that under its legal system, courts are
required to seek evidence to assist defense counsel as well as prosecutors. The Austrian Cen-1
Authority therefore will make such requests to the United States under the Treaty. The United States
delegation stated that the United States Central Authority ordinarily does not make treaty requests on
behalf of defense counsel. The negotiators agreed that the Treaty is not available for use by private
counsel representing civil litigants as a means of evidence-gathering in criminal or civil matters.
Private litigants in the United States may continue to obtain evidence from Austria by letters
rogatory, an avenue of international assistance leR undisturbed by the Treaty." Id.
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powerful tool to counteract the majoritarian bias that previously existed in the
political process. Senators need no longer fear being voted out of office when
they refuse to ratify an MLAT which creates a compulsion disparity. The cover
of a court ruling insulates them from threats of ouster.
Defining a strong right to compulsory process has many disadvantages,
however. MLATs are important law enforcement tools in a world of
transnational crime. Their creation entailed monumental efforts and hard-fought
compromises to harmonize differing legal systems in order to combat the
exponential rise in global crime.240Effective transnational prosecutions require
mandatory mechanisms for obtaining evidence from foreign nations. The
willingness of nations to work with the United States to create these mechanisms
~
MLATs
depends upon our willingness to enter into M L A T S ? ~Declaring
unconstitutional would return nations to square one, creating international
friction and irritation?42
Even if nations feel inclined to renegotiate, their own domestic politics may
make renegotiation difficult. The court's decision invalidating MLATs
compromises the executive's authority and legitimacy to negotiate new treaties.
How would the executive officials convince foreign nations that these
renegotiated treaties would not be declared unconstitutional? Moreover, if new
treaties cannot be negotiated, the United States may once again resort to the
unilateral actions that so angered foreign nations in the past.243 A strong right
thus raises serious foreign policy concerns.

VI.
CONCLUSION
Comparative institutional analysis must inform any decision of how to
obtain a desired goal or policy, because there is rarely one easily identified first
and best institution. The framework teaches that the choice is amongst imperfect
and flawed alternatives, each burdened with its own benefits and drawbacks.
Explicit institutional comparison teases out existing institutional biases and
helps to avoid unanticipated results or unintended consequences. Without
comparative analysis, a role may be defined for the court that exacerbates an
240. See supra notes 182-208 and accompanyingtext.
241. "[Wle need to receive confirmation from the Senate that the Senate believes that the
conclusion of MLAT's is in the best interest of the United States. We cannot sensibly continue in
this direction if the Senate believes otherwise. We cannot reasonably expect foreign govemments to
adopt meaningful cooperative agreements with us if we are unable to ratify the MLAT's that we
have urged them to conclude. Senate advice and consent to ratification of the six pending MLAT's
also would show foreign governments that their efforts to cooperate with the United States in law
enforcement matters have not been in vain." Cayman Islands, supra note 1, at 221 (testimony of
Mary Mochary).
242. Of course, the executive could mitigate the foreign policy damage caused by this approach
by alloxing foreign nations to continue to request evidence from the United States.
243. See supra notes 118,121-124and accompanying text.

110

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTEWATIONAL LA W

[Vol. 26: 1

existing malfunction in another institution or produces a counter-intuitive result.
No matter what the criminal process question is, explicit institutional
consideration and comparison forces contemplation of nuanced questions and
avoids simplistic answers and knee-jerk institutional choices.
Applying the comparative framework to the question of how to achieve
compulsion equity in transnational criminal cases demonstrates its usefulness.
At first blush, it may appear that a strong right to compulsion parity in
transnational criminal cases would best protect the twin goals of accuracy and
fairness in criminal adjudications. However, comparative institutional analysis
reveals a potentially counter-intuitive negative result from this seemingly
attractive option.
Strong compulsory process rights could undermine accuracy norms. Under
a strong rights approach, if the executive is unable to renegotiate the existing
MLATs to explicitly protect parity, the parties are left to rely upon the evidencegathering market that existed prior to M L A T S . This
~ ~ ~market does not provide
the parties with reliable access to material and relevant evidence from foreign
nations. Surprisingly, a strong right makes prosecution of the guilty more
difficult and increases the risk that a factually innocent person will be
wrongfully convicted. Accordingly, a strong right is not the best option.
A moderate right to compulsion parity provides the best solution to
remedying the compulsion disparity in transnational evidence-gathering. The
potential problem with a moderate rights approach is uncertainty about whether
a foreign nation will comply with a government request on behalf of defendants.
However, nothing in the treaties' language prevents this type of request, and the
U.S. government has expressed the view that foreign nations will honor it.245A
moderate right would leave MLATs intact, thereby avoiding serious foreign
policy concerns. Under this approach, the courts would determine, on a case by
case basis, whether to order the prosecution to request defense evidence.
Although a moderate right requires courts to use more resources in making case
by case materiality determinations, these decisions are already made by courts in
most criminal cases. The increased burden upon the courts will thus be
negligible. With MLATs in place, both parties will be able to present foreign
evidence to the trier of fact. Comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that
a moderate right provides the best safeguard for protecting the innocent and
convicting the guilty in transnational criminal cases.

244. See supra notes 243-250 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 241,

